Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause by Armacost, Barbara E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 94 Issue 4 
1996 
Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause 
Barbara E. Armacost 
University of Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the 
Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
982 (1996). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss4/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES, SYSTEMIC HARMS, 
AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Barbara E. Armacost* 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman suffers permanent injury when she is shot during a 
robbery. She brings suit under the Due Process Clause alleging that 
municipal police failed to protect her from the injury. Plaintiff chal-
lenges the city's policy of disregarding calls for assistance unless and 
until a crime actually has been committed and alleges that the city 
has failed to provide adequate police protection in a high-crime 
area.1 
A mother brings suit under the Due Process Clause to recover 
for injuries to her young son who suffered permanent brain damage 
when his caseworker failed to remove the child from the custody of 
his abusive father. The social worker's notes indicate that she was 
worried about the child's safety, but she apparently failed to moni-
tor the situation closely enough.2 
Police officers arrest an intoxicated driver, impound his car, and 
leave his female companion stranded in a dangerous section of the 
city. The woman brings suit under the Due Process Clause for inju-
ries sustained when she is mugged and raped while walking to a 
local convenience store to call for a ride home.3 
* * * 
The scenarios above have a number of things in common: in 
each of them, the immediate cause of the injury was a nongovern-
mental actor. Also in each, the plaintiff sought to bring suit not 
against the private tortfeasor but against the government, on the 
theory that state or local officials deprived the plaintiff of a liberty 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.S. 1976, University of Virginia; 
M.T.S. 1984, Regent College, University of British Columbia; J.D. 1989, University of 
Virginia. - Ed. I thank Lillian BeVier, Clay Gillette, Jack Goldsmith, John Jeffries, Glen 
Robinson, George Rutherglen, Bob Scott, Elizabeth Scott, Mike Seidman, Bill Stuntz, and 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the partici-
pants in a workshop at the University of Virginia and Tom Beshere, Victoria Corke, and 
Chris Gacek for research assistance. 
1. See Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
2. See DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 {1989). 
3. See Hilliard v. City of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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interest by failing to prevent the injuries from occurring. The other 
commonality is that none of these scenarios ultimately resulted in 
governmental liability. The rationale for nonliability as expressed 
by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services4 is that the Due Process Clause 
is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guaran-
tee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the 
State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 
"due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to 
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those in-
terests do not come to harm through other means.5 
In the oft-repeated words of Judge Richard Posner, "[T]he Consti-
tution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties."6 
Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the only context in 
which it is certain that the government has an affirmative duty to 
protect citizens from harm by third parties is where the plaintiff is 
in the government's custody.7 
The DeShaney holding has engendered a scholarly response that 
is impassioned and unequivocally negative.s The facts of 
DeShaney, which in part drive much of the criticism, are "undenia-
bly tragic":9 social workers followed a four-year-old child's case, 
4. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
5. 489 U.S. at 195. 
6. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 
(1984). 
7. Prisoners, pretrial detainees, and involuntarily committed psychiatric patients enjoy a 
right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm while in governmental custody. See Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires the government to 
provide medical care to incarcerated prisoners); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 
463 U.S. 239 (1983) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to 
provide medical care to pretrial detainees); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide for the reasonable 
safety of involuntarily committed mental patients). 
8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 403 
(1993); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990); 
Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 1078; Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of Finding No State 
Action, 10 No1RE DAME L. REv. 95 (1994); Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmen-
tal Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107 
(1991); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 1991 DuKE L.J. 507; Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The 
Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113 (1990); Laura Oren, The 
State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 
N.C. L. REv. 659 (1990) [hereinafter Oren, DeShaney in Context]; Louis Michael Seidman, 
The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 379 (1993); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambi-
tion, Formalism, and the "Free World" ofDeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1513 (1989); 
David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. Cr. 
REv. 53; Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
9. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191. 
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documented evidence of abuse by the child's father, but ultimately 
failed to remove him from his father's custody before he suffered 
beatings that left him permanently brain damaged.10 The majority's 
reminder that Joshua's father inflicted the injury and that "[t]he 
most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that 
they stood by and did nothing"ll is normatively unappealing; one 
might argue that the government exists, at least in part, to protect 
us from certain harms, and it should not be permitted to stand by 
and do nothing. Moreover, it is not wholly accurate to say that the 
government simply did nothing with regard to Joshua: in both gen-
eral ways, by establishing a department of social services and pass-
ing laws regulating marriage and the family, and specific ways, by 
awarding custody of Joshua to his father and assigning a case-
worker to follow him, the government took positive action with re-
gard to Joshua and indeed may have discouraged potential private 
rescuers from taking action to prevent the harm.12 
Although no one is inclined to object to the Supreme Court's 
holdings that those in custody have the right to receive some mea-
sure of protection from injury13 - no one argues that the govern-
ment can throw you in jail and take no responsibility for providing 
your basic needs - it is hard to articulate exactly why, as a consti-
tutional matter, custody is special. The DeShaney Court reasoned 
that the government's duty to protect is triggered when it restrains 
an individual's ability to act on her own behalf or plays a part in 
creating or increasing the danger of harm.14 That reasoning appeals 
to powerful and widely shared normative intuitions about appropri-
ate governmental behavior; and certainly custody is the most dra-
matic example of the government limiting one's ability to care for 
oneself. But it is not clear how the normative intuitions captured in 
the Court's reasoning are derived from the Due Process Clause and 
- to the extent they are - why the same reasoning would not 
apply to a case like DeShaney. It is disingenuous to say that the 
government did not shape and constrain Joshua's ability to protect 
himself, even if less so than in the custodial setting. 
10. See 489 U.S. at 191-93, 208-09; see also infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
11. 489 U.S. at 203. 
12. See 489 U.S. at 208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
13. See supra note 7. 
14. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-01. 
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In light of the nearly universal condemnation of DeShaney, 15 it 
might come as a surprise that "failure-to-protect"16 claims in the 
broader legal context only rarely result in liability. DeShaney is not 
an outlier in the judicial landscape: in numerous cases spanning 
more than a decade prior to DeShaney, the lower federal courts 
were uniformly reluctant to hold the government liable for failures 
to protect and did so only in very narrow circumstances. In addi-
tion, there is a whole universe of ordinary tort cases virtually identi-
cal to the cases that have been brought under the Due Process 
Clause. In the tort context - contrary to a strong, general trend 
toward increased governmental liability - the overwhelming pre-
sumption against liability for failure to protect has held fast. 
Critics of DeShaney have not given adequate consideration to 
this broader legal landscape and the clues it offers for understand-
ing the Supreme Court's rejection of constitutional failure-to-
protect claims. This article suggests that the constitutional cases are 
better explained, not by constitutional text or history, but by judi-
cial reluctance to second-guess legislative decisions about budget-
ary matters, the same concerns that account for the presumptive 
rule of nonliability in tort. This rationale for the nonliability rule 
makes DeShaney a much harder case on its facts and goes a long 
way toward a more satisfying positive account of the Supreme 
Court's approach to this line of cases. It also provides a plausible 
counterargument to the moral and constitutional objections to non-
liability in cases like DeShaney. 
Part I of the article lays out the major academic criticisms of 
DeShaney. Part II describes the contours of liability for failure to 
protect in tort. Part III offers a positive explanation for the strong 
presumption against governmental liability17 in failure-to-protect 
15. See supra note 8. Indeed, I have not found a single article purporting to offer a posi-
tive rationale for nonliability. 
16. By "failure to protect," for purposes of this article, I am referring to situations in 
which the immediate, physical cause of the injury was a nongovernmental actor or entity and 
the claim is that the government had a duty to prevent that injury. I understand that in many 
such instances governmental behavior could be described as either act or omission. The ter-
minology is not important; the question in these cases is the extent of the government's obli-
gation to take precautions against injuries by third parties. 
17. By "governmental liability," I mean liability against states or localities or against state 
or local officers. In tort, the extent of governmental liability is determined by common law 
and statutory rules governing sovereign immunity. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying 
text. In the constitutional context, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which provides a cause of action 
for deprivations of constitutional rights, permits suits against municipalities for actions that 
execute a governmental "policy or custom," see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978), as well as against local officials in their individual capacities. The Eleventh 
Amendment bars § 1983 suits for damages against states and state officers in their official 
capacities. Injunctive relief, however, may be obtained against state officials - and so as a 
986 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:982 
cases: permitting broad liability for failure to protect would involve 
the courts in second-guessing political decisions about the use of 
limited community resources. This explanation has two parts. First, 
as a matter of institutional competence, budgetary decisions about 
the appropriate level and distribution of public services are better 
suited to political rather than judicial resolution. Second, failure-
to-protect claims are more likely to involve the courts in budgetary 
review than other kinds of claims against the government. One 
may question exactly where the line between political and judicial 
action ought to be, but the notion that there is a line somewhere -
and that judges are seeking to draw such a line in these cases -
resonates in many areas of the law. Part IV demonstrates that the 
resource-allocation rationale has significant explanatory power in 
constitutional failure-to-protect cases. To the extent these consider-
ations are a significant part of what is driving the results in failure-
to-protect cases, they have not been addressed adequately by 
DeShaney's critics. 
I. THE "DUTY-To-PROTECT" IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."18 The text of the Clause has been 
interpreted to create certain substantive rights as well as to guaran-
tee the right to adequate process. That is, there are certain things 
the government may not do, regardless of how much process it pro-
vides.19 Perhaps the most well known of the substantive due pro-
cess rights is the right to privacy.20 The Due Process Clause also 
has been construed to forbid a category of tortlike deprivations of 
life, liberty, or property. For example, under certain circum-
stances,21 a prison official who deliberately - or reckless1y22 -
practical matter against the state itself - through the "fiction" of suing state officials in their 
individual capacities. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
19. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
20. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21. The Supreme Court has held that there can be no deprivation within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause if there are adequate state postdeprivation remedies. See Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327 (1986). 
22. The Due Process Clause requires more than negligence, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327, 
but the Supreme Court has not opined on exactly what level of intent - between negligence 
and willfulness - is required to make out a claim. See 474 U.S. at 334 n.3. The courts of 
appeals are divided on the issue. See, e.g., Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir.) (reck-
lessness); Fagan v. City of Vmeland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir.), affd. on rehg., 22 F.3d 1296 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("shock the conscience"); Temkin v. Frederick County Commr., 945 F.2d 716 (4th 
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lost23 or damaged24 a prisoner's personal effects could be charged 
with unlawful deprivation of property; an official who acted with 
deliberate indifference toward a serious threat of illness or injury 
could be found to have violated a liberty interest.25 Although many 
of these tortlike cases have involved prisoners, a number of courts 
have permitted suits for such injuries outside the custodial setting, 
for example, injuries resulting from the reckless or intentional ac-
tions of police officers.26 
In DeShaney, petitioners, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney and 
his mother, sought to extend the reasoning of these tortlike due 
process cases by arguing that the Wmnebago County Social Ser-
vices Department had deprived Joshua of "his liberty interest in 
'free[dom] from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security,' by 
failing to provide him with adequate protection against his father's 
violence. "27 For the two years prior to the serious injuries that gave 
rise to this suit, the Winnebago County Social Services Department 
had been monitoring Joshua, who had been in the official custody 
of his father since his parents' divorce when Joshua was still an in-
fant, for suspected abuse by his father Randy Deshaney.28 During 
these two years of monitoring, there were numerous incidents sug-
gesting possible child abuse, including three emergency-room visits 
for suspicious injuries, reports of suspected abuse by neighbors and 
the father's second wife, and visits by a social worker who observed 
a number of suspicious injuries.29 Although the social worker "du-
Cir. 1991) (same); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); 
Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987) (gross negligence or recklessness). 
23. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 527. In Parratt, officials who lost a prisoner's hobby kit were 
found to have deprived him of property but not without "due process of law" because there 
were adequate state postdeprivation remedies. See 451 U.S. at 543-44. 
24. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). The claim in Hudson, alleging intentional 
destruction of property, ultimately failed because adequate state postdeprivation remedies 
were available. See 468 U.S. at 533-36. 
25. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). The Court denied the prisoner's claim 
in Davidson because he had not made a showing that prison officials were more than merely 
negligent See 474 U.S. at 347-48; see also supra note 22. 
26. See, e.g., Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985} (holding that 
plaintiff whose decedent was killed when police officers mistook him for a fugitive and reck-
lessly shot into his truck could recover under Due Process Clause); Ragusa v. Streator Police 
Dept., 530 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that due process claim for intentional depri-
vation of property arising out of impoundment of plaintiff's truck by the police survived 
motion to dismiss). 
27. DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) 
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). 
28. See 489 U.S. at 191-93. 
29. See 489 U.S. at 192-93, 208-09. At one point when Joshua was admitted to a local 
hospital with multiple injuries, the examining physician notified the Wmnebago Social Serv-
ices Department that he suspected child abuse. The Department obtained a court order plac-
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tifully recorded these incidents in her files, along with her continu-
ing suspicions that someone in the DeShaney household was 
physically abusing Joshua,"30 no action was taken to remove him 
from his home. In 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so savagely 
that he suffered a series of cerebral hemorrhages, leaving him pro-
foundly retarded and likely to spend the rest of his life in an 
institution.31 
The Supreme Court rejected Joshua's due process claim. The 
Court concluded that neither the language of the Due Process 
Clause itself nor its history support the "expansive reading"32 that 
would permit petitioner's claims. The Court reasoned that 
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against 
invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on 
the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels 
of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals 
of life, liberty, or property without "due process of law," but its lan-
guage cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation 
on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm 
through other means.33 
The Court also noted that, as a historical matter, the purpose of the 
Due Process Clause "was to protect the people from the State, not 
to ensure that the State protected them from each other."34 
At the same time, the Court affirmed its prior holdings involv-
ing affirmative duties owed to persons in governmental custody on 
the ground that the government's "act of restraining the individ-
ual's freedom to act on his own behalf - through incarceration, 
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty" 
triggers a duty to "assume some responsibility for his safety and 
general well-being."35 Such duties arise when, as in the custodial 
ing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital. The hospital convened a "Child 
Protection Team," consisting of physicians and other hospital personnel, social workers, po· 
lice, and the county's lawyer, which ultimately determined that there was insufficient evi-
dence of child abuse to retain custody of Joshua. The Child Protection Team, however, did 
recommend a number of measures to protect Joshua, and Joshua's father entered into a vol-
untary agreement to cooperate with the Team in accomplishing these goals. Based on the 
Team's recommendation, the juvenile court dismissed the child-protection case and returned 
Joshua to his father's custody, where the abuse apparently continued. See 489 U.S. at 192. 
30. 489 U.S. at 193. 
31. See 489 U.S. at 193. 
32. See 489 U.S. at 195. 
33. 489 U.S. at 195. 
34. 489 U.S. at 196. 
35. 489 U.S. at 200. 
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setting, the government by the use of its power "so restrains an in-
dividual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself."36 
Scholars have criticized DeShaney37 on a number of grounds, all 
of which lead them to conclude that there should be liability under 
the facts of DeShaney or, at the very least, broader liability than the 
Supreme Court's holding appears to permit. Many of the criticisms 
are driven, at least in part, by the compelling and ultimately tragic 
story behind the case. The facts suggest that governmental officials 
may have acted irresponsibly in the face of significant evidence that 
harm was likely to occur. The government's failure to protect a 
helpless child from a known abuser conflicts with widely held norms 
requiring minimally reasonable behavior. It also bumps up against 
common expectations about how we think the government, in par-
ticular, ought to behave: many people would consider it "wrong" 
for a police officer to fail to respond to a call for help or for a social 
worker to ignore evidence that a child was being abused38 and per-
haps would be surprised if they found that there were no legal sanc-
tion for doing so.39 
Another source of criticism is the DeShaney Court's rationale 
for, on the one hand, rejecting petitioners' claim that the Due Pro-
cess Clause creates a general duty to protect and, on the other 
hand, affirming the existence of such a duty in the custodial con-
text.40 As David Currie and others have pointed out, constitutional 
cases have found affirmative governmental obligations in many 
36. 489 U.S. at 200. The Court explicitly left open the possibility that government-
ordered foster care might be sufficiently anafogous to custody to give rise to a duty to pro-
tect. See 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
37. See supra note 8 (citing articles). 
38. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 8, at 128. 
39. Ordinary citizens, of course, have no legally enforceable duty, except in narrow cir-
cumstances, to rescue their fellow citizens or protect them from threatened or impending 
harm. For articles critical of the no-liability rule for private rescuers, see, e.g., James Barr 
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the 
Duty to Rescue, 47 V AND. L. REv. 673 (1994}; Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamina-
tion and Proposa~ 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 423 (1985); and Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical 
Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 
WASH. U. L.Q.1 (1993); see also Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolu-
tion and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879 (1986). 
40. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 ("[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its 
power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at 
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs - e.g. food, clothing, shelter, medi-
cal care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by 
the ..• Due Process Clause."); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 
(1983) {holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide medical 
care to pretrial detainees); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 {1982) {holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires the government to provide for the reasonable safety of involun-
tarily committed mental patients). 
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"negatively phrased provisions."41 Indeed, the Due Process Clause 
itself has been construed to create certain positive duties in addition 
to the affirmative duties of protection owed to individuals in cus-
tody. 42 Moreover, as a purely linguistic matter, the operative word 
"deprive" certainly could support the more passive meaning urged 
by the DeShaney petitioners; it could mean, for instance, "to keep 
[a person from] what he would otherwise have."43 
A number of scholars have sought to defend a broader reading 
of the Due Process Clause by attacking the Court's account of con-
stitutional history and seeking to demonstrate that the historical 
meaning of the Clause included a general duty to provide protec-
tion against private harms.44 These accounts may call into question 
the Court's conclusion that Fourteenth Amendment history fore-
closes a more broadly defined duty to protect. They do not, how-
ever, offer an explanation of the scope of liability in failure-to-
protect cases prior to DeShaney nor do they provide a basis for 
deciding what the proper limits of such a right might be.4s 
The Court's identification of custody as the only context that 
gives rise to a duty to protect has also been the subject of strong 
criticism. The Court's logic for permitting liability in the custodial 
context seems to be that, although private action was not the imme-
diate cause of the injury, "state action [was] present in the back-
ground; the state's action placed the victim in a position where he 
41. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 
886 {1986). See generally id. at 872-86; Eaton & Wells, supra note 8, at 122-23. Cases finding 
affirmative obligations in "negatively phrased provisions" include, for example: Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980) {holding that the government must pro-
vide access to certain information); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 {1972) {holding that a prisoner 
must be provided reasonable opportunity to pursue his religion); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) {holding that the government must provide counsel to indigent 
defendants). 
42. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 {1971) (holding that a state may not deny, 
solely because of inability to pay, access to state-controlled divorce proceeding); Truax v. 
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (holding that a state must provide a remedy against picketing 
by striking workers on employer's property). 
43. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 490 (2d ed. 1989), quoted in Eaton & Wells, 
supra note 8, at 116 {alteration in original). For example, it seems perfectly natural to con-
clude, in the context of a schoolyard fight, that those who prevent a student's buddies from 
intervening to protect him from the school bully have "deprived" him of the opportunity to 
avoid a bloody nose. 
44. See, e.g., Eaton & Wells, supra note 8, at 118-21; Heyman, supra note 8, at 546-54, 
557-63, 566-70; Oren, DeShaney in Context, supra note 8, at 687-92; Seidman, supra note 8, at 
382-83; Soifer, supra note 8, at 1521-26. But see Currie, supra note 41, at 865-66 {"The Fram-
ers would have been astounded to hear it contended that by adopting the Bill of Rights they 
had managed to make mandatory the exercise of a Congressional power to help needy citi-
zens ••.. "). 
45. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 512. 
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or she could be injured."46 The intuition for finding affirmative du-
ties in the custodial situation is undoubtedly strong: "When the 
state is obviously, visibly responsible for a person's vulnerability to 
private violence, no court has denied that the state ought to provide 
some protection against the private wrongs that the person suf-
fers. "47 But, as David Strauss points out, the Court's logic could be 
extended to other, noncustodial situations in which governmental 
action has compromised an individual's ability to protect herself: 
"[S]tate action is always present in the background" in the sense 
that it "contributes to the condition in which all members of society 
... find themselves."48 The Court gives no clear explanation -
constitutional or otherwise - for halting liability at the prison 
door. 
A related criticism focuses on the Court's characterization of 
the facts of DeShaney as a governmental failure to act - to which 
the Due Process Clause has nothing to say - rather than as gov-
ernmental action. As the dissent in DeShaney pointed out, the dis-
tinction between action and inaction may simply depend upon how 
broadly in time one defines the injuring event:49 Is the appropriate 
starting point for analysis the action of governmental officials in es-
tablishing a social services department and taking on the task of 
monitoring Joshua DeShaney for suspected child abuse but doing it 
badly? so Or is the case better characterized as governmental failure 
to act to prevent purely private harm, where the government had no 
role in creating the risk of harm in the first place and so has no duty 
to prevent it from occurring? 
Along the same lines, Professor Beermann criticizes the very 
limited liability permitted under DeShaney as inconsistent with gov-
ernmental responsibility in the modem welfare state.51 He argues 
46. Strauss, supra note 8, at 67. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 205-11 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
50. See 489 U.S. at 208-11. An even broader temporal view would argue that the estab-
lishment of laws applicable to marriage and family, which by definition limit the possibilities 
of rescue from certain harms, is the starting point for analyzing governmental liability. See 
Strauss, supra note 8, at 64-65 (arguing that the state's role is not limited to the custody 
award to Joshua's father; the family unit itself is largely the product of state regulation). 
51. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1089; see also Bandes, supra note 8, at 2311 ("The 
welfare state, with its proliferation of government regulation and subsistence programs, little 
resembles the polity with which the Framers were familiar."); Tribe, supra note 8, at 9-14 
(calling for "circumspection and questioning in assessing how the distribution and direction 
of all public powers - including those of judges - define the legal space through which we 
all move"). 
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that the government's extensive involvement in modem society 
"creates dependencies that give rise to further responsibility."52 
The existence of "[g]overnment[al] institutions invite[s] people to 
rely on their programs," and, "[w]hen government fails to act as 
individuals legitimately anticipated, it is as if government has 
yanked a chair out from under a person as she settled into the 
chair."53 Thus, citizens who rely on the existence of agencies that 
fail to deliver are made worse off because the existence of such en-
tities discourages intervention by alternative private entities.54 
Building on the DeShaney dissent, Beermann argues that "the exist-
ence of a social services department . . . strengthens the case for 
judicial intervention by raising the possibility that absent the local 
agency, people in the community might have aided Joshua on their 
own."55 
All of these criticisms seek to undermine the Court's nearly cat-
egorical rejection of duty-to-protect liability apd provide a starting 
point for permitting broader liability, including liability under the 
facts of DeShaney. While almost no one seriously argues that the 
government should be liable for all external harms,56 DeShaney's 
critics argue for much broader liability than is currently available. 
A number of proposals have been offered for identifying what 
kinds of governmental behavior should give rise to liability for fail-
ure to protect. 
Thomas Eaton and Michael Wells have proposed a framework 
for analyzing constitutional duty-to-protect claims which seeks to 
52. Beermann, supra note 8, at 1089. 
53. Id. at 1096. 
54. See id. David Strauss makes the similar point that governmental failure to act, like a 
negligently performed rescue, "may have worsened the victim's situation by causing the vic-
tim to forgo other sources of aid or by discouraging other potential rescuers from coming to 
the victim's aid." Strauss, supra note 8, at 62; see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) ("Wisconsin's child-protection program • • • effectively confined Joshua 
DeShaney within the walls of Randy DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took 
action to remove him."); Oren, DeShaney in Context, supra note 8, at 695-97, 703-05 ("Hav-
ing actively put the child in an isolated position and knowing of the specific danger that he 
faced, the state should not then escape all constitutional accountability."); Soifer, supra note 
8, at 1518-20 ("The idea that the state did not worsen Joshua's situation by appearing to 
protect him, that it is absolved because it did not affirmatively erect an obstacle, is belied by 
the record."). 
55. Beermann, supra note 8, at 1096. But see Seidman, supra note 8, at 386 (arguing that 
Justice Brennan's claim rests on "sheer speculation"). 
56. Jack Beermann appears to argue - astonishingly in my view - that the Due Process 
Clause should be understood to create a general duty to protect citizens from all civil harm of 
which governmental actors are aware. Beermann ultimately concedes that his argument 
taken to its logical stopping point "may even point toward unlimited government responsibil· 
ity for all private misfortune and private misconduct - a plainly unacceptable result." 
Beermann, supra note 8, at 1089. 
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work within the boundaries set by DeShaney, while taking the 
broadest possible reading of its rationale.57 They argue that liability 
for failure to protect should rest on two factors. First, liability 
should attach whenever the state's involvement in producing the 
plaintiff's plight is sufficiently egregious that it "imping[es] a plain-
tiff's constitutionally protected right to respectful treatment by gov-
ernment officers."58 This factor would be satisfied when the state 
has "imposed limitations on self-help and private rescue,"59 when 
the state affirmatively has contributed to the danger that caused the 
harm,60 or when the government's actions have worsened the plain-
tiff's situation.61 Second, government officials whose actions satisfy 
the first factor would be liable only if their actions amount to "de-
liberate indifference" to the risk of harm.62 Eaton and Wells argue 
that the presence of these two factors identifies failures to act that 
are sufficiently "egregious and abusive"63 to amount to constitu-
tional violations. · 
Similarly, David Strauss argues that the Court's distinction be-
tween custodial and noncustodial situations should be abandoned 
and proposes that liability should attach whenever the govern-
ment's withholding of protection constitutes an "abuse of power."64 
Envisioning the government as a "fiduciary," Strauss argues that 
governmental officials abuse their power whenever they fail to act 
with "the degree of prudence that an ordinary person would show 
in conducting his or her own affairs."65 Under this approach, 
merely negligent actions or omissions would trigger liability under 
57. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 8. Although Eaton and Wells have chosen to craft 
their proposal to fit within the rationale of the DeShaney holding, in a world of their own 
creation, they apparently would support significantly broader liability. See id. at 166 ("The 
only firm rule laid down in DeShaney is that officials owe no duty to help a person unless the 
state played at least some part in creating a peril or in rendering the victim more vulnerable 
to it. •.. Hopefully, the Court will someday reconsider this rule in light of considerations of 
justice and the pervasive role of government in modern life."). 
58. Id. at 144. 
59. Id. at 147-49. 
60. See id. at 149-55. 
61. See id. at 155-58. Eaton and Wells suggest that these situations are ones that would 
comprise a common law "special relationship." See id. at 147. The tort-law special relation-
ship giving rise to a duty to rescue by governmental officials is, however, significantly nar-
rower than Eaton and Wells envision. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
62. See Eaton & Wells, supra note 8, at 159-65. 
63. See id. at 159. 
64. See Strauss, supra note 8, at 79-80. The underlying interest being deprived, according 
to Strauss, is the property interest in having governmental decisions made in a nonarbitrary 
and nonabusive way: the establishment of a governmental program "creates an interest, pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, in a decision based on the government's agenda rather 
than the private agenda of the responsible official." Id. at 81. 
65. Id. at 83-84. 
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the Due Process Clause.66 Strauss's analysis would increase signifi-
cantly the universe of tortlike due process claims - including those 
not involving failure-to-protect cll}ims - permitted under current 
law.67 
* * * 
The above criticisms point out the difficulties inherent in seek-
ing to understand the Supreme Court's holding entirely on the basis 
of constitutional text and history. They also give expression to the 
normative objections raised by a rule that appears to permit gov-
ernmental officials to behave irresponsibly. At the very least, these 
criticisms substantially undermine the Court's arguments for nonli-
ability in cases like DeShaney. 
The great amount of attention and criticism that followed the 
DeShaney decision has, however, left the mistaken impression that 
the Court's approach to liability for governmental failure to protect 
was unprecedented or without legal "pedigree." Those who push 
for expansive due process liability for failure to protect have not 
considered adequately that such claims are generally and strongly 
disfavored in the broader legal context, for example, in tort.6B The 
66. See id. at 84. 
67. Strauss concedes that his proposal threatens to tum a "variety of ordinary torts by 
state officials" into "federal constitutional claims." Id. at 84. He proposes to remedy that 
problem by: (1) requiring plaintiffs with procedural claims to look to adequate state reme-
dies and (2) requiring "[m]any wrongs now viewed as violations of the Due Process Clause" 
- for example, "physical abuse by a state official ••. an unreasonable seizure of the person" 
- "[to be seen] as violations of more specific constitutional provisions." Id. at 84-85. It 
seems clear, however, that Strauss's proposal would substantially increase the scope of 
tortlike claims that could be litigated in federal court. Under current law, a plaintiff who 
alleges a tortlike substantive due process claim is precluded from bringing a federal claim if 
state remedies are available and adequate. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
Strauss's framework apparently would eliminate that requirement except where the claim is 
procedural. See Strauss, supra note 8, at 84-85. On Strauss's second point, it is unclear ex-
actly what universe of due process claims could be litigated under more specific constitu-
tional provisions if the current boundaries of those provisions were respected. For example, 
physical abuse by a state official would not be a seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless 
intentionally applied. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). That means that 
anything less than "intentional" physical deprivation - which presumably is what interests 
Strauss - would continue to fall into a residual category of tortlike claims that could be 
litigated under the Due Process Clause. 
68. Eaton and Wells recognize and briefly discuss the implications of "tort policy" in 
formulating their paradigm for analyzing failure-to-protect cases. See Eaton & Wells, supra 
note 8, at 110, 127-33, 142-43. However, they fail to appreciate the explanatory power of tort 
policies in accounting for the existing pattern of liability in this class of cases, and - perhaps 
for that reason - they do not take seriously enough the rationales behind the tort policies 
they identify. See also Beermann, supra note 8, at 1093 ("Because imposing positive duties 
on government raises questions about allocation of governmental resources, these problems 
may be somewhat less amenable to judicial resolution than other constitutional problems."); 
Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort, 16 U. MICH, 
J.L. REF. 1 (1982) (noting, in a pre-DeShaney analysis of failure-to-protect cases, that such 
cases are best viewed as a blend of constitutional and tort principles). 
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puzzle, then, is whether there is a sensible explanation for the rule 
of nonliability, which appears to conflict with powerful normative 
intuitions about governmental behavior but has a solid and long-
standing legal pedigree. The pattern of liability in tort provides in-
sights into a possible rationale for nonliability in the constitutional 
context. 
II. THE TORT-LAW PEDIGREE OF NONLIABILITY FOR FAILURE 
To PROTECT 
As a preliminary matter, one might question the relevance of 
tort law in analyzing constitutional damages claims. The simplest 
response is that section 1983,69 which in two sentences of text pro-
vides the cause of action in damage suits for constitutional viola-
tions, simply leaves unresolved many basic issues, such as rules for 
determining causation and computing damages, the role of govern-
mental immunities, and what statutes of limitations should apply. 
In adjudicating section 1983 claims, the federal courts have a long-
standing practice of borrowing tort rules to fill those "gaps," rea-
soning that the drafters legislated against the background of com-
mon law rules applicable to analogous cases.10 The kinship 
between section 1983 claims and common law civil-damages claims 
is so well accepted that the former have become known as "consti-
tutional torts. "71 
More specifically, many section 1983 claims alleging depriva-
tions of life, liberty, and property under the Due Process Clause are 
69. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
70. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1978) (stating that the common law 
applicable to tort damages is the starting point for a damages inquiry under § 1983); Pierson 
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (stating that there is no reason to believe that the com-
mon law immunity applicable to judges was abolished by § 1983). Once adopted by the fed-
eral courts, the common law rules have evolved into a form that is distinctively federal, 
constituting a body of "federal common law" applicable to § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Carey, 
435 U.S. at 258 (noting that the common law damage rules must be adapted to provide fair 
compensation for constitutional injuries); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976) 
(discussing common law prosecutorial immunity and considering whether "the same consid-
erations of public policy that underlie the common law rule likewise countenance absolute 
immunity under § 1983"). 
71. The term "constitutional tort" first appears in the scholarly literature in Marshall 
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 
277, 323-24 (1965). 
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factually indistinguishable from garden-variety tort actions against 
the government. Indeed, in many cases, the same underlying fact 
pattern and resulting injury could give rise to both constitutional 
and tort claims, and litigants often attempt to bring claims under 
both federal and state law.72 It is not surprising, then, that courts 
adjudicating these tortlike injuries under the Due Process Clause 
have looked to tort law and policies in setting the boundaries of 
liability for constitutional damage claims. 
Claims of governmental failure to protect in tort typically in-
volve injuries by nongovernmental actors or instrumentalities, that 
governmental service providers - such as police, firefighters, social 
workers, and so on - failed to prevent. The most common fact 
pattern in these cases is that the government received a call for help 
or had knowledge of a particular risk of harm and failed to respond 
quickly or adequately in order to prevent the injury from occurring. 
When analyzing such cases, an overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions start with a presumption that the government generally is not 
liable for failing to protect people from injuries by nongovernmen-
tal sources, even when governmental officials have been informed 
or are aware of the risk of harm.73 
The doctrine that is most often invoked for denying liability in 
such cases is the so-called public duty rule. That rule provides that, 
in situations involving certain services such as police and fire pro-
tection, the government "has a duty to the general public, as op-
posed to [any] particular individual," and thus the breach of that 
duty does not give rise to a private damage claim.74 The purpose of 
the public duty rule is to "protect[ ] municipalities from liability for 
72. Plaintiffs may prefer to bring the federal claim, if possible, in order to gain access to a 
federal forum and take advantage of attorneys' fee awards available to prevailing plaintiffs 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1983 claims, of course, also may be litigated in state 
court. The elements of the constitutional claim, however, will differ in important respects 
from the elements of an analogous tort claim. For example, although § 1983 itself has no 
intent requirement, damage liability under the Due Process Clause requires that the actions 
giving rise to the deprivation be more than negligent. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 
(1986). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the existence of an adequate state 
postdeprivation remedy forecloses many tortlike due process claims on the grounds that the 
plaintiff has received all the process that is due. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
Liability against the governmental unit itself under § 1983 also requires a showing that the 
deprivation resulted from a governmental "custom or policy." See Monell v. Department of 
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
73. See generally w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 131, at 1047-50 (5th ed. 1984); 18 EUGENE McQuILLJN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 53.04.50 (James Perkowitz-Solheim et al eds., 3d ed. 1993); Horace B. 
Robertson, Jr., Municipal Tort Liability: Special Duty Issues of Police, Fire, and Safety, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 943, 946-52 (1993). 
74. 18 McQum.m, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 165; see also Moch Co. v. Rensselaer 
Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
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failure to adequately enforce general laws and regulations, which 
were intended to benefit the community as a whole."75 So, for ex-
ample, state or local governments may be required by law to estab-
lish and operate police, fire, social services, and other similar 
departments.76 But their responsibility in doing so is to provide 
general protection to the public at large,77 and, in most cases, no 
individual has a cause of action in damages if those services fail to 
prevent a particular injury from occurring.1s 
The general rule is illustrated in the well-known case of Riss v. 
City of New York. 79 In that case, a young woman, Linda Riss, had 
sought the arrest of Burton Pugach, a rejected suitor, who allegedly 
had threatened her repeatedly with death or bodily harm over a 
period of six months. When she became engaged to another man, 
Pugach again threatened her, and she notified the police. The fol-
lowing day, a thug hired by Pugach threw lye in Riss's face, causing 
disfigurement and serious vision loss. In affirming dismissal of the 
claim, the Court of Appeals of New York reasoned that to proclaim 
a general duty of protection based on a "showing of probable need 
for and request for protection"so would rearrange legislative-
75. 18 McQUILUN, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 165. 
76. The public duty itself is generally understood to derive from state or municipal law. 
See, e.g., Steitz v. City of Beacon, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. 1945) (city charter provided that 
the city " 'may construct and operate a system of waterworks' " and that " 'it shall maintain 
fire, police, school and poor departments.' "). Such laws, however, are construed to require 
only that the government establish and operate certain services and departments. These pro-
visions are not understood to provide a cause of action running in favor of any particular 
individual or group. See, e.g., 64 N.E.2d at 706 ("[P]rovisions [of the city charter] were not in 
tenns designed to protect the personal interest of any individual and clearly were designed to 
secure the benefits of well ordered municipal government enjoyed by all as members of the 
community."). 
77. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968); 18 McQUILLIN, supra note 
73, § 53.04.25, at 165; see also Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 1981) ("A 
person does not, by becoming a police officer, insulate himself from any of the basic duties 
which everyone owes to other people, but neither does he assume any greater obligation to 
others individually. The only additional duty undertaken by accepting employment as a po-
lice officer is the duty owed to the public at large.''). 
78. Courts at times have articulated the nonliability rule for failure to protect in tenns of 
immunity for "discretionary" functions. See, e.g., Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1980) (finding no liability for failure to apprehend rapist who subsequently raped and 
murdered the plaintiff's decedent). Alternatively, courts have reasoned that the provision of 
certain protective services, such as inspections required by municipal building or fire codes, 
was intended for the protection generally from particular hazards, rather than as a service to 
any particular individual. See, e.g., Green v. Irwin, 570 N.Y.S.2d 868 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(finding a town not liable for negligent issuance of a building permit simply because the 
issuance was shown to be in violation of the building code). The terminology is not impor-
tant to my argument. My point is simply that such cases ordinarily do not give rise to govern-
mental liability, whatever the doctrinal explanation for the result. 
79. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968). 
80. 240 N.E.2d at 861. 
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executive decisions about how the community's limited resources 
should be allocated and result in liability "without predictable llin-
its. "81 The court distinguished cases where "police authorities un-
dertake responsibilities to particular members of the public and 
expose them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then 
materialize into actual losses."82 
As noted in Riss, there is a limited doctrinal category of failure-
to-protect cases - the so-called special relationship cases - that 
may give rise to liability. These cases represent an exception to the 
public duty rule in cases where "there was a 'special relationship' 
between a public official and a particular individual that [gives] rise 
to a duty to that individual separate from the official's duty to the 
general public. "83 The special relationship exception, according to 
the courts, permits liability for failure to protect when the plaintiff 
was injured while in government custody84 or when government of-
ficials have given assurances or acted in a way that induced the vic-
tim reasonably to rely to his detriment on the promise of 
protection.85 A finding of liability requires significantly more than 
a call for help;86 the courts have required a showing that the gov-
81. 240 N.E.2d at 860-61. 
82. 240 N.E.2d at 861 (citing Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958)). 
In Schuster, a witness who had supplied infonnation to the police leading to the arrest of a 
dangerous fugitive received threats to his life and subsequently was shot to death. His estate 
sued on the grounds that the police negligently had failed to provide him with a requested 
bodyguard or other protection. The court held the government liable on the ground that the 
police owe a special duty to protect those "who have collaborated •.• in the arrest or prose-
cution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collabora-
tion." 154 N.E.2d at 537. 
83. 18 McQun.r.IN, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 166. 
84. See, e.g., Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841S.W2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to 
find a special relationship when victim was not in state custody); Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 
481 (La. 1976) (finding a state liable for the death of a prisoner when officials reasonably 
should have anticipated attack); Daniels v. Andersen, 237 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. 1975) {finding a 
state liable to an intoxicated victim who was locked up in a "drunk tank" where he was 
beaten by another drunk). 
85. See Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 938 (N.)'. 1987). There also may be 
liability for governmental failure to protect against hann by dangerous persons who are re-
leased from custody, when such persons have threatened hann to particular individuals. 
Compare Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968) (finding liability for failure to warn when 
specific person is threatened) with Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 {Cal. 1980) 
(finding no liability for failure to warn neighbors when prisoner's threat to kill was not di-
rected toward identifiable individual). 
86. See, e.g., Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 {Ct. App. 1975) (finding no 
liability for failure of the police to respond to a plea made 45 minutes before homicide); 
Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance, 114 Cal. Rptr. 332 (a. App. 1974) {finding no liabil-
ity for police radio dispatcher who delayed broadcasting burglary in progress for 10 minutes 
after alann triggered); McCarthy v. Frost, 109 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1973) {finding no 
liability when the police negligently failed to find a motorist who required medical aid}; 
Hines v. District of COiumbia, 580 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1990) {finding no liability for alleged 
failure to dispatch emergency medical care); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 
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ernment officer gave the plaintiff specific assurances of protection, 
that she relied on those assurances, and that the claimed injury re-
sulted from the plaintiff's reliance on the promise to protect.87 
Thus, for example, a claim that police officers failed to protect a 
particular individual from injury by nongovernmental actors is gen-
erally not cognizable; a successful claim would require sufficient 
prior contacts between police and the individual to indicate a spe-
cific undertaking or promise by the police to provide protection and 
detrimental reliance by the individual. Absent such facts, there is 
generally no liability for failure to enforce laws and regulations in-
(D.C. 1981) (finding no liability in a suit against the police by women assaulted in their 
homes by intruders); City of Rome v. Jordan, 426 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. 1993) (finding no liability 
for failure to respond to a call by the assault victim's sister-in-law informing the police that 
the perpetrator was at the victim's house); Lewis v. City of Indianapolis, 554 N.E.2d 13 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1990) (finding no liability for failure to timely answer 911 call); Trezzi v. City of 
Detroit, 328 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding no liability for 90-minute delay in 
sending police to the scene after 911 call when the behavior at most was negligent); Doe v. 
Hendricks, 590 P.2d 647 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no liability for allegedly slow police 
response to a call for help by the neighbor of a child who was abducted and dragged into an 
abandoned house); Merced v. City of New York, 551 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1990) (finding a mu-
nicipality not liable for injuries resulting from failure reasonably to investigate a 911 call by 
the victim's neighbor when there was no evidence that the victim relied on assurances of 
assistance); Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1989) (finding no liability 
when a police officer failed to act on a citizen report of abduction that resulted in the victim 
being raped and locked in a trunk for 12 hours); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 525 
N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1988) (finding no liability to family of a crime victim alleging negligent 
response to an emergency call); Steiner v. City of Pittsburgh, 509 A.2d 1368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1986) (finding no liability to a rape victim who sued the city for failure to respond to her 
emergency call). But see Barth v. Board of Educ., 490 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding 
the municipality liable to an injured student for misconduct of a 911 operator); Schear v. 
Board of County Commrs., 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (finding a municipality may be liable 
when a police department failed to respond to an emergency call for assistance from a 
woman who subsequently was raped). 
f!>/. See, e.g., Delong v. Erie County, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Chambers-
Castanes v. King County, 669 P.2d 451 (Wash. 1983). The court in Cuffy laid out the factors 
to be established in order to prove the existence of a special relationship: 
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative 
duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the 
municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact 
between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable 
reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking. 
505 N.E. at 940. In Cuffy, although police had given assurances that they would arrest the 
individual who allegedly posed a threat to plaintiffs, their injuries were not caused by reliance 
on these assurances. See 505 N.E. at 941. 
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tended to benefit the eommunity as a whole,88 failure to provide 
police or fire protection,s9 or failure to inspect.9o 
Significantly, the public duty rule as applied to failure-to-protect 
claims has remained the law in a substantial majority of jurisdic-
tions,91 despite criticism in the literature92 and in the courts93 and 
despite an overwhelming trend toward abrogation of sovereign im-
88. See, e.g., O'Connor v. City of New York, 447 N.E.2d 33 (N.Y. 1983) (finding no liabil-
ity for negligence of a building inspector who certified that a new gas pipe conformed to city 
regulations despite an open gas pipe and the absence of a shut-off valve at the connection to 
the main line at the street). 
89. See, e.g., Frye v. Clark County, 637 P.2d 1215 (Nev. 1981) (finding no governmental 
liability for an alleged failure to respond to an emergency call reporting a fire); Steitz v. City 
of Beacon, 64 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1945) (finding no governmental liability for failure to main-
tain adequate fire-fighting equipment and failure adequately to maintain the water pressure 
and flow-regulating valve near the plaintiff's property). See generally Robertson, supra note 
73, at 946-50; supra note 86. 
90. See, e.g., Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 204 N.E.2d 635 (N.Y. 1965) (finding no gov-
ernmental liability for property damage and deaths resulting from a fire caused by a defective 
oil-heating stove even though the fire-department official had failed to report the defective 
stove after it had caused a previous fire). In some safety inspection cases, courts have found 
a special relationship based on the particular facts of the case. See, e.g., Gordon v. Holt, 412 
N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1979). Other courts impliedly or explicitly have abrogated the pub-
lic duty rule with regard to negligent fire inspections, holding that such inspections are for the 
benefit of the occupants of the inspected buildings, a "special identifiable group of persons." 
Robertson, supra note 73, at 953; see, e.g., Wtlson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979). 
91. See generally 18 McQUILLIN, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 165. For cases purporting 
to abandon the public duty rule, see, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976); 
Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indiana River 
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart 
v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980); Schear v. Board of County Commrs., 6'61 P.2d 728 
(N.M. 1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P .2d 719 (Or. 1979); Catone v. Medberry, 555 
A.2d 328 (R.I. 1989); and Wood v. Milin, 397 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1986). In a number of these 
jurisdictions, however, the state legislatures have responded by passing statutes exempting 
particular emergency services from liability for failures to protect. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09-65.070 (1994); lowA ConE ANN. § 670.4 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:2793.1 (West 1991). In addition, many jurisdictions have other immunity rules that pro-
tect municipalities from liability. See 18 McQmLLIN, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 167; see 
also Gordon v. Bridgeport Hous. Auth., 544 A.2d 1185 (Conn. 1988) (finding a city immune 
from liability under discretionary-function exception for assault that occurred in public hous-
ing project). Other jurisdictions employ ordinary tort doctrines - such as the requirements 
of foreseeability and causation - to limit the scope of municipal liability. See 18 
McQUILLIN, supra note 73, § 53.04.25, at 167. 
92. See, e.g., Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., Municipal Liability Through a Judge's Eyes, 44 SYR-
ACUSE L. REv. 925 (1993); Albert J. Hamo, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. 
L.Q. 28 (1921); Daniel C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United 
States: 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795; see also James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' State 
Law Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1991). 
93. In New York, for example, after an extensive and impassioned debate in majority and 
dissenting opinions over a number of years, the rule ultimately was reaffirmed. See 
O'Connor v. City of New York, 447 N.E.2d 33 (N.Y. 1983). See generally Hancock, supra 
note 92. Similarly, when the Arizona state courts moved to abrogate the public duty rule, the 
legislature stepped in to reestablish the narrow limits of affirmative-duty liability in that state. 
See Bird v. State, 821P.2d2'61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing a negligence claim against a 
state on the ground that the earlier common law rule imposing liability had been overruled 
by state legislature). 
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munity for much negligent harm-causing behavior by governmental 
officials.94 As a historical matter, both states9s and municipalities96 
were largely immune from suit. In recent times, an increasing 
number of jurisdictions have abrogated or modified state sovereign 
immunity by statute.97 Similarly, the modem trend is toward abro-
gation of traditional distinctions that protected municipalities from 
liability in certain circumstances - such as liability for proprietary 
functions but not governmental ones - and toward a general doc-
trine of liability for negligent actions.98 Despite the general trend 
toward broader liability, the nonliability rule for governmental fail-
ure to protect has remained largely intact.99 Indeed, a number of 
jurisdictions that have substantially abrogated municipal immunity 
by statute have carved out specific immunities disallowing failure-
to-protect claims against police, firefighters, 911 and other 
protective-service providers. mo 
94. See generally 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., JAMES AND GRAY ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS §§ 29.6, 29.11, at 620-22, 691-92 (2d ed. 1986). 
95. States are generally immune from suit without their consent. See generally 5 id. 
§ 29.2-29.4, at 599-600, 603-05. 
96. Traditionally, municipalities were immune from suit for "governmental functions" -
functions they performed as agents or representatives of the state - but not for other "pro-
prietary functions." See generally 5 id. § 29.6, at 622-39. The tests most commonly invoked 
for distinguishing governmental from proprietary functions are: "(1) whether the function is 
allocated to the municipality for its profit or special advantage or whether for the purpose of 
carrying out the public functions of the state without special advantage to the city, and (2) 
whether the function is one historically performed by the government." 5 Id. § 29.6, at 627. 
97. See generally 5 id. § 29.11, at 690-95. 
98. See generally Note, Municipal Tort Liability in Virginia, 68 VA. L. REV. 639, 639 n.2 
(1982) (noting that 43 jurisdictions have abolished or limited the scope of immunity for gov-
ernmental functions); see also generally 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 94, § 29.6, at 622-39; 18 
McQurLLIN, supra note 73, § 53.02.05, at 130. 
99. The public duty rule is a judicially created rule. However, courts have continued to 
apply the rule even after legislative abrogation of municipal sovereign immunity. 
100. These statutes generally provide immunity from liability for failure to provide cer-
tain protective services or for harms done by third parties that city employees allegedly failed 
to prevent. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1994) (providing that fire departments and 
911 services have immunity for failed response); ARIZ REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820.01 to 
-820.05 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (providing immunity for police for failure to arrest or prevent a 
crime); CAL. GoVT. CODE§§ 845, 846, 850 (West 1995) (providing no liability for failure to 
provide police protection, fire protection, or failure to arrest); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745, para. 
10/4-103 to 10/4-107 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing immunity for failure to provide police 
protection or failure to arrest); IowA CODE ANN. § 670.4 (West Supp. 1995) (providing im-
munity for failure to act if damage is caused by a third party and for failure of a 911 service to 
respond); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793.1 (West 1991) (providing immunity for damage 
caused by a crime or fire unless "grossly negligent"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9 (1995) 
(providing that police and fire fighters are immune unless exercising "reckless disregard"); 
TEX. C!v. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055 (West 1986) (providing immunity for failure 
to provide police and fire protection and failure to respond to emergencies); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. § 63-30-10 (1993) (providing immunity for failure to provide emergency medical assist-
ance or fire service); W. VA. CODE§ 29-12A-5 (1992 & 1995 Supp.) (providing immunity for 
failure to provide police and fire services). 
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The fact that the public duty rule has survived against the tide of 
increasingly broad governmental liability does not prove, of course, 
that courts have good or coherent reasons for invoking it.101 I con-
sider the question of what might explain the courts' line between 
liability and nonliability in Part ID below. My purpose here is sim-
ply to point out that the strongly held presumptive rule in this class 
of tort cases is that there is generally no liability for governmental 
failure to protect. At the very least, the tenacity of that rule sug-
gests that there may be a coherent rationale behind the courts' 
seeming reluctance to find liability in failure-to-protect cases. 
Ill RATIONALE FOR THE NONLIABILITY RULE 
In the preceding section I made an important - and, I believe, 
neglected - observation: contrary to what one might have pre-
dicted, at least from the overwhelmingly negative reaction to 
DeShaney, the ordinary rule in a whole universe of cases involving 
failure to protect in tort is that the government generally has no 
duty to protect from third-party harm. The observation itself is sig-
nifi.cant: DeShaney's critics have tended to treat the case as a legal 
outlier and - perhaps as a result - have found little reason to 
consider whether there may be a plausible or persuasive explana-
tion for it. The pattern of limited liability observed in tort is also 
important in another way: it mirrors the pattern found in the con-
stitutional cases. That observation suggests that the primary driving 
force behind DeShaney and similar constitutional cases may not be 
constitutional text or history but the same kinds of considerations 
that have led to the rejection of such claims in the tort context. If 
so, it would go a long way toward explaining why the Court's con-
stitutional analysis in DeShaney has proved so unsatisfying. 
A standard rationale offered by the state courts for the so-called 
public duty rule in tort is that permitting liability for inadequate 
protection would make the courts the arbiters of decisions about 
how to allocate finite public resources and manpower that are best 
left to the political branches. The level of protection that the gov-
ernment plausibly can provide is determined, in large part, by the 
amount of resources the legislature has allocated to particular serv-
101. The mere longevity of a rule or pattern of liability does not, of course, prove that the 
rule or pattern has a coherent or normatively defensible explanation. On the other hand, one 
ought at least to entertain the possibility that a rule for handling certain kinds of cases that 
endures over time - in this case against a legal environment moving in the opposite direc-
tion - could reflect a defensible, if not normatively satisfying, rationale. That is especially 
true when the general pattern of liability has been repeated, as we shall see, in two different 
legal contexts in which different patterns might have been predicted. 
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ices.102 Permitting individuals to bring failure-to-protect claims 
would require the courts to review resource-allocation decisions 
and permit judges to mandate a level of protection different from 
the level determined by the political branches.103 
The above rationale has two parts: first, it takes the view that 
resource-allocation decisions are political ones and that permitting 
judges to review them is inappropriate. Second, to the extent this 
explanation is used to defend nonliability for duty-to-protect claims 
- as opposed to other kinds of claims against the government - it 
assumes that duty-to-protect claims are significantly more likely to 
implicate judicial second-guessing of budgetary decisions. This Part 
fleshes out these two propositions in more detail in order to explore 
whether or not some version of the resource-allocation rationale for 
retaining sovereign immunity in this class of cases is defensible. 
A. Resource Allocation and Institutional Competence 
In our governmental system, it is uncontroversial that budgetary 
decisions are ordinarily political decisions. That is, judgments 
about what combination of goods and services will be provided by 
the government, how much money is required to supply such serv-
ices, and how available funds will be allocated ordinarily are made 
by citizens through their elected representatives. To the extent that 
failure-to-protect cases involve the judiciary in second-guessing 
such decisions (an issue I discuss in the next section), they raise the 
question whether these cases are appropriate for judicial resolution. 
As a matter of institutional design, budgetary decisions gener-
ally are thought to be political decisions rather than judicial ones, at 
least in part, because they involve a kind of decisionmaking that 
courts do not do well. Courts specialize in resolving disputes be-
tween two parties, each of whom can represent its interests before 
the court, "by declaring victory for one and a loss for the other."104 
They are not, however, well-suited to resolving what have been 
called "polycentric"lOS problems. "Polycentricity" is "the property 
102. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860 (N.Y. 1968). 
103. See 240 N.E.2d at 860; see also Mann v. State, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (a. App. 1977) 
(Statutory immunity for failure to protect "was designed to prevent political decisions of 
policy-making officials of government from being second-guessed by judges and juries .... 
In other words, [the] essentially budgetary decisions of these officials were not to be subject 
to judicial review in tort litigation."). 
104. CLAYrON P. GILI.ETI'E, LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 396 (1994). 
105. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-49 (1982); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394 (1978). The concept of polycentricity apparently 
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of a complex problem with a number of subsidiary problem 'cen-
ters,' each of which is related to the others, such that the solution to 
each depends on the solution to all the others."106 To illustrate, 
consider the task of deciding how one million dollars in research 
funds should be allocated among many competing scientific 
projects: the decision is never one of 
Project A v. Project B, but rather of Project A v. Project B v. Project 
C v. Project D ... bearing in mind that Project Q may be an alterna-
tive to Project B, while Project M supplements it, and that Project R 
may seek the same objective as Project C by a cheaper method, 
though one less certain to succeed, etc.101 
The less the dispute at issue resembles the winner-takes-all model 
and the more polycentric elements it contains, the less amenable it 
is to judicial resolution.10s 
The budgetary process that allocates public money among gov-
ernmental goods and services is polycentric in a way that makes 
judicial resolution problematic.109 Budgetary decisions involve bal-
ancing the interests and preferences of individuals and groups with 
divergent demands for a finite "pot" of public monies. In a world 
of limited resources, every budgetary decision involving a particular 
good or service requires adjustment and readjustment of allocations 
applicable to other goods and services. For example, more re-
sources for police protection means less for education or fire pro-
tection or public parks; more money for public parks or schools 
requires more money for infrastructure to service them; less money 
for police might affect the mix of other services that depend on po-
lice and so on. Thus, the point is not only that more of a particular 
service "x" means less of "y" and "z" but that the levels of x, y, and 
was derived from MICHAEL PoLANYI, THE Lome OF LmERTY: REFLEcnoNs AND REJOIN· 
DERS 171 (1951). 
106. Fletcher, supra note 105, at 645. Lon Fuller compares a polycentric situation to a 
spiderweb: "A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern 
throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply 
double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of 
tensions." Fuller, supra note 105, at 395. 
107. Fuller, supra note 105, at 401. 
108. As Fuller points out, polycentricity is a matter of degree; almost all problems 
presented for adjudication involve some polycentric elements. There is, however, a point at 
which the polycentric elements so dominate a problem that attempting to resolve it in a 
judicial forum may exceed the "proper limits of adjudication." Id. at 398-99. Legal scholars 
disagree as to where the dividing line ought to be drawn between functions that are appropri-
ate for judicial resolution and those that are so polycentric as to exceed the capabilities of the 
judicial process. But the debate itself presupposes widespread agreement that there is - or 
ought to be - such a line and that the relative polycentricity of legal problems is relevant to 
the line-drawing process. 
109. See generally GII.LETIE, supra note 104, at 394-96. 
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z are intertwined such that effectuating a workable arrangement 
among them after increasing the level of x requires a number of 
interrelated adjustments and readjustments in order to reach a new, 
workable equilibrium. Courts are not institutionally equipped to 
make the adjustments and readjustments necessary to resolve 
budget-allocation issues.110 
These kinds of decisions are best handled in a forum where all 
the affected interests can appear before the decisionmaking body 
and the "multiple centers can engage in exchange and consider the 
claims of others,"111 a forum that looks much more like a legislative 
committee or other political entity than a court. Legislatures, un-
like courts, have access to both the information and the deliberative 
processes necessary to permit that kind of exchange. Legislators 
are in contact with both the wide variety of citizen demands for and 
views about certain distributions of public resources and the admin-
istrative and fiscal realities faced by those who administer various 
public programs. They can gather information, hold public hear-
ings, and promote negotiation and debate among affected interests 
in order to analyze various alternatives and consider the broader 
ramifications of those alternatives. Indeed, the legislative process is 
the consummate forum for this kind of multidimensional 
deliberation.112 
The traditional judicial role, on the other hand, is to adjudicate 
particular cases involving the specific legal rights and interests of 
the parties before the court. While judges are clearly aware of -
and, in some cases, influenced by - the broader consequences of 
their decisions, their ability to consider such consequences is quite 
limited. For example, courts generally do not permit nonparties to 
110. In the words of William Fletcher, resolution of such interlocking disputes requires 
mutual spontaneous adjustment by the constituent parts of the problem itself - rather 
like the bees in a hive finding their appropriate space and function by their sense of the 
bees around them, with each bee individually adjusting to its neighbors, and each neigh-
boring bee in tum adjusting to the other's adjustment until a stable equilibrium is 
reached. 
Fletcher, supra note 105, at 647 (citing PoLANYI, supra note 105); see also HENRY M. HART 
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPU-
CATION OF LAw 669 (tentative ed.1958) (noting that polycentric problems "present so many 
variables as to require handling by the method either of ad hoc discretion or of negotiation or 
of legislation"). 
111. G1LI.EITE, supra note 104, at 396. 
112. It is, of course, open to debate how well legislatures function in their deliberative 
capacity: whether they actually reflect the preferences of their various constituencies or 
whether they have been captured by special interests and lobbyists. That question is beyond 
the scope of this article. My only point is that, as a matter of institutional competence, there 
is reason to believe that legislatures are in a better position than courts to handle these sorts 
of questions. 
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argue the broader ramifications of the case at bar for other situa-
tions or issues not before the court.113 Moreover, unlike legisla-
tures, courts cannot hold hearings to gather information that might 
be relevant to the polycentric aspects or broader context of their 
decisions. They are limited to the facts and information made avail-
able by the parties before them. To make the point in the budget-
ary context, a court holding that a municipality must increase the 
level of a particular governmental service, such as police or fire pro-
tection, would not - unlike the legislature that made the initial 
allocation decisions - have sufficient information to consider the 
complicated effects of its ruling on other, interrelated budget 
allocations.114 
The rise of structural-reform litigation has, of course, posed a 
challenge to the traditional judicial role described above. In 
structural-reform cases, the litigants seek, not so much to resolve a 
binary dispute between two or more parties, but to make systemic 
changes in governmental institutions, operations, or procedures.us 
For example, desegregation cases seek not simply to remedy spe-
cific instances of unlawful discrimination but rather to reverse the 
effects of years of enforced segregation through structural remedies 
such as busing and magnet schools. Structural-reform remedies in-
volve the courts in such nontraditional functions as running the day-
to-day operations of schools and prisons and even intervening to 
permit the taxation necessary to fund such activities.116 Signifi-
cantly, however, the farther such cases have moved away from the 
more traditional judicial role - for example, from prohibiting de 
113. Under certain circumstances, nonparties may be able to file amicus curiae briefs in 
order to bring additional information before the court, assure presentation of the complete 
factual scenario, or point out the broader implications of the court's decision. Such participa· 
tion, however, is limited, and the rules regarding the participation of amicii curiae differ 
among various federal and state jurisdictions. See generally Michael K. Lowman, Comment, 
The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1243 (1992); Randy S. Parlee, A Primer on Amicus Curiae Briefs, Wis. LAW., Nov. 
1989, at 14. 
114. See generally Ann Judith Gellis, Legislative Reforms of Governmental Tort Liability: 
Overreacting to Minimal Evidence, 21 RUTGERS LJ. 375 (1990). Gellis states: 
A government decision to provide a good which is either unavailable in, or inadequately 
supplied by, the private sector involves various sub-decisions relating to the provision of 
that good: how much to produce, who should receive the good, how to finance it, and 
how to structure delivery of the good. These decisions are complicated political deci-
sions, quite apart from the political nature of the budgetary process. • . . [T]he complex-
ity of the decision-making process as to the entire output makes it far less certain that 
the judiciary has the information necessary to second guess as to any one decision. 
Id. at 386. 
115. See PETER W. Low & JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL R10HI'S AcnoNs: SEcnoN 1983 
AND RELATED STATUTES 721 (2d ed. 1991). 
116. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
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jure discrimination to busing and requiring capital expenditures on 
magnet schools - the more they have been subject to criticism on 
institutional competence grounds.117 That is because these broad 
remedies - the exact contours of which are not constitutionally 
compelledllS - require judges to entertain such questions as what 
specific educational facilities and programs a locality should pro-
vide to its students119 and what constitutes a well-run prison.120 
These kinds of decisions are not only highly polycentric, but they 
look more legislative or executive than judicial, in part, because 
there is very little in the way of legal norms to guide the discretion 
of the decisionmaker.121 Scholars endorsing judicial intervention in 
structural-reform cases have found it necessary to defend the legiti-
macy of such cases against those who attack them on institutional 
competence grounds.122 Moreover, the Supreme Court's restric-
tions on such remedies can be seen as an effort to cabin judicial 
discretion in order to address the nontraditional aspects of these 
cases.123 
117. See generally Fletcher, supra note 105, at 640-41. 
118. In structural-reform cases, there are generally a number of permissible ways in 
which a constitutional violation could be remedied. For example, in a prison-overcrowding 
case the judge could order the release of prisoners, improvement of existing facilities, or the 
building of new facilities. See id. at 646-47. 
119. For example, one district court decree required 
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 
15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; green-houses and vivariums; a 25-
acre farm with air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations 
wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an 
editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and 
screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot 
elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous 
other facilities. 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
120. Decrees in prison and mental hospital cases may specify, among other things, "pre-
cise staffing ratios, the temperatures in rooms or cells, the types and quantities of food to be 
served, [and] the manner of determining types of and times for isolation or solitary confine-
ment." Fletcher, supra note 105, at 639. . 
121. See generally id. at 645-49. Fletcher argues that courts called upon to formulate 
broad structural remedies are dealing with nonlegal-polycentric problems that call into ques-
tion their institutional authority because courts have "no guidance from legal norms as to the 
appropriate values to be served by the solution[s]." Id. at 647. Even when judicial interven-
tion is itself "triggered by the violation of a legal standard," the court reaches beyond the 
limits of the judicial role when the remedy calls on the court to "reorganize the governmental 
functions of a political branch of [the government]." Id. 
122. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 28-44 (1979); Fletcher, supra note 105, at 641-49, 692-97; David 
Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611, 624-37 (1983). 
123. Examples of the Supreme Court's efforts to limit the potential reach of structural 
reform remedies are the requirement that the remedy be closely tailored to the constitutional 
violation, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974), and the enforcement of standing 
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To illustrate the problem in the budgetary context, imagine, for 
example, a claim by city residents whose property has been dam-
aged in a fire that the city's one fire station is inadequate to provide 
reasonable fire protection to their neighborhood. Suppose further 
that remedying the situation would require the city to build a new 
fire station to serve that part of the city. The remedy would not 
only require the city substantially to increase the part of the budget 
allocated to fire protection, it would also affect other parts of the 
budget: the increase in money allocated to fire protection would 
have to come out of the funds originally allocated for some other 
service. But the requirement that more money be spent for fire 
protection - for example, by decreasing the budget for police serv-
ices - would also involve deciding how the increase in fire protec-
tion and decrease in police protection would affect the mix of other 
services. Thus, the resolution of the one issue - the alleged need 
for more fire protection services - would require not just a substi-
tution of funds from one service to another but a reallocation of a 
large part of the municipal budget.124 
A court called upon to adjudicate the claim described above, 
unlike the political process that formulated the original budget, 
would not have before it the whole range of tradeoffs and interlock-
ing budgetary issues that would be affected by its resolution of the 
claim. The court's view is limited to the parties before it (in this 
case, the injured plaintiff and the city as defendant) and considera-
tion of one governmental service (fire protection) as if it existed in 
a vacuum. But fire protection does not exist in a vacuum; it is inex-
tricably intertwined with many other items in the budget that origi-
nally were determined by balancing all manner of individual and 
collective preferences. 
Given the institutional limitations of the judicial process, there 
is no reason to think that the court is likely to make a better alloca-
tion than the legislature that made the initial budgetary decisions. 
For example, how do we know whether more fire protection and 
less police protection - or perhaps more of both and higher taxes 
- would make citizens better off, even in the narrow sense of less 
lives and property being lost? Moreover, once we broaden the 
"better off" question and begin to weigh less police protection 
against less education or less sanitation, the question of "correct-
requirements, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983); see also infra 
notes 229-231 and accompanying text 
124. See generally GILLETIE, supra note 104, at 394-95. 
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ness" seems impossible to answer as a legal matter.125 To borrow a 
garden metaphor: In order "[t]o preserve some substance for the 
form of adjudication you have to judge pumpkins against pumpkins, 
not pumpkins against cucumbers, especially when there are some 
relevant cucumbers not entered in the show."126 The point here is 
not that politicians do a perfect job at making these sorts of deci-
sions but that there is no reason to think courts would do it better. 
It seems clear that courts have no apparent institutional advantage 
over the political processes in decisionmaking of this sort. 
The notion that courts are not institutionally well suited to 
second-guessing certain kinds of decisions is not a new or particu-
larly controversial idea; it resonates in many areas of the law. My 
point here is to show that it has great explanatory power in failure-
to-protect cases. I turn, then, to the question whether failure-to-
protect claims are more likely than other kinds of claims against the 
government to involve the court in second-guessing resource-
allocation decisions. 
B. Special Concerns Raised by Failure-To-Protect Claims 
As noted above,127 the strong trend in tort law is toward increas-
ingly broad governmental liability. Against that general trend, 
however, courts and legislatures have continued to adhere to a rule 
of nonliability for governmental failure to protect. The rationale 
that has been given for this special treatment is that these sorts of 
claims involve the courts in second-guessing resource-allocation de-
cisions.128 This Part explores whether the courts' distinction be-
tween failure-to-protect claims and other kinds of claims against the 
government is defensible. 
125. There are, of course, some judicially enforceable legal restraints on the relative dis-
tribution of goods and services, such as constitutional prohibitions against discrimination on 
the basis of race or sex. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Thurman v. City of Torrington, 
595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). 
126. Fuller, supra note 105, at 403. 
127. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. 
128. Available state legislative history confirms that the rationale for statutes disallowing 
failure-to-protect claims is legislators' view that decisions about whether and at what level to 
provide certain protective services lies properly within the purview of the political process 
rather than the courts. See, e.g., Sovereign Immunity Study, 5 CAL. L. REVISION CoMMN. 
REPORTS 11, 464 (1963) (noting that the decision of whether to provide fire protection was 
primarily political and "quite unfitted to the processes of judicial administration"); Tort Lia-
bility of Public Entities and Public Employees: Recommendation, 4 CAL. L. REVISION 
CoMMN. REPORTS 807, 860-861 (1963) ("To permit review of these decisions [whether to 
provide police or fire protection] by judges and juries would remove the ultimate decision-
making authority from those politically responsible for making the decisions."). 
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To begin, consider a claim of failure to protect brought by a city 
resident whose children were burned to death in a house fire.129 
Prior to the time of the fire, the city, for financial reasons, had be-
gun closing a number of firehouses on a random, rotating basis. 
Plaintiff alleges that the firehouse nearest to her home was closed 
on the day of the fire, that the closure constituted negligence on the 
part of the city, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of 
her children's deaths. Plaintiff's theory of liability under these facts 
raises the specter of judicial budgetary review in a dramatic form: 
first, it seems clear that the government's failure to respond in this 
situation resulted from conscious policy decisions about how to 
manage municipal resources. Governmental officials apparently 
found it necessary to cut the level of services in order to remain 
within the budget that the legislature had allocated for the service. 
In addition, officials made resource-allocation decisions at the oper-
ational level when they decided to close firehouses on a rotating 
basis rather than, for example, closing one firehouse permanently 
or decreasing staffing at all fire stations. A court entertaining plain-
tiff's claim would be required to review these decisions based on 
the court's independent judgment as to whether the city's decision 
to cut services and its method for doing so were reasonable. For the 
reasons laid out above, 130 there is no reason to think that state 
courts are better equipped than members of the political branches 
to get the resource-allocation issues right.131 
Of course, not all failure-to-protect cases raise resource-
allocation issues so starkly as the fire protection example. Imagine, 
for example, claims by two different plaintiffs who are beaten by 
thugs in a city metro station and bring suit against the municipal 
police department for failure to prevent these injuries.132 The first 
plaintiff alleges that police officers who arrived on the scene during 
the beating failed to intervene before he was seriously injured. In 
the second incident, police officers failed to arrive at all. The sec-
129. These facts are drawn from Chandler v. District of Columbia, 404 A.2d 964 (D.C. 
1979). 
130. See supra notes 104-26 and accompanying text. 
131. Of course, not all such cases would result in liability. Plaintiff would have to demon-
strate that the government was at fault and that its actions were the legal and proximate 
cause of the injury; she ultimately may be unable to do so. But the argument against liability 
is that even entertaining cases that challenge resource allocations necessarily would involve 
the court in reviewing political decisions and raise institutional competence concerns. 
132. The facts are based, with modifications, on Crosland v. New York City Transit Au-
thority, 498 N.E.2d 143 (N.Y. 1986). I am indebted to Clay Gillette for the comparison of 
Chandler with Crosland, which appears in GILLETIE, supra note 104, at 714-18, and which he 
discussed with me at some length. 
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ond plaintiff alleges that the city was negligent in not having one or 
more police officers available or permanently assigned to this par-
ticular station because there had been a number of previous inci-
dents of violent crimes there. The first claim is more likely to go 
forward and could lead to liability assuming that the plaintiff can 
make out the elements of the claim. The second claim will virtually 
never succeed because, as explained by one court, it "alleges a fail-
ure to properly allocate police resources."133 
In what sense does the second claim involve the court in review-
ing resource-allocation decisions that the first claim does not? Both 
claims implicate budgetary matters in that liability could require the 
government to spend more of its available resources on police serv-
ices: permitting liability for failure to have enough officers at par-
ticular locations ultimately would force the city to hire more police 
officers, which would obviously require greater expenditures for 
police protection.134 On the other hand, liability based on the the-
ory that officials on the scene failed to intervene might also require 
more resources to be devoted to police services, for example, to 
provide better training and supervision or to hire more competent 
police officers.135 
These two claims differ significantly, however, in the way they 
implicate underlying political decisions. In considering the first 
claim, the court is being called upon simply to enforce the decision 
of the political branches to provide a certain level of police protec-
tion to the public. That is, once the decision has been made to fund 
a police department and police officers are actually on the scene, 
liability simply requires them to do the job they were intended to 
133. Crosland, 498 N.E.2d at 145. 
134. In the first instance, the police department could respond to liability for its failure to 
post officers at the metro station by shifting available officers from other locations, rather 
than by hiring additional officers. But the police department's ability to cover all locations 
where third-party harms are likely to occur is obviously limited by the number of available 
officers. It seems likely that, over time, liability based on the theory that more officers ought 
to have been stationed at more locations would put significant pressure on the city to hire 
substantially more police officers. 
135. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 865 (N.Y. 1968) (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). There is, however, a plausible argument that these two kinds of claims would differ 
significantly in the degree to which liability would affect the municipal budget. In many in-
stances, one could expect that increasing the level of services - hiring more police officers, 
building more firehouses - would be more expensive than reasonably maintaining the level 
of services one already has. This difference in degree surely matters if we are concerned 
about liability that implicates resource allocation. Claims that would have an incidental ef-
fect on the municipal budget by requiring the government to spend more money on supervi-
sion and training are at one end of the spectrum, and claims that would require the 
reallocation of enough resources to increase the level of services, plausibly requiring re-
sources to be moved from one service "box" to another, are at the other. 
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do in a reasonable manner. By permitting liability in this situation, 
the court is not requiring the government to do anything more than 
it already has committed itself to do. In essence, the court is en-
forcing the political bargain: the legislative decision to have a rea-
sonably functioning police department.136 Permitting such cases to 
go forward may have an effect on the budget - in that it may cost 
money - but it does not involve the court in reviewing the legisla-
· tive allocations themselves.131 
The second claim, however, would involve the court in quite a 
different kind of review: the number of police officers that are 
available to answer calls - the size of the police force and the level 
of police services that plausibly can be provided - is a direct func-
tion of the level of resources that the legislature has devoted to po-
lice services. Liability for failure to have more officers at particular 
locations would redefine the politically determined level of service 
by requiring a more extensive police force. Moreover, the very pro-
cess of determining whether there ought to have been more police 
officers stationed at this or that place - or whether police should 
have been available to answer this or that call - inevitably requires 
the court to ask the resource-allocation questions: Was the level of 
police services that the government chose to provide adequate, or, 
at the very least, was the city's operational allocation of existing 
police services appropriate? It is hard to imagine what the legal 
standard for such review would be: What constitutes an appropri-
ate level of any particular service? Further, how can that question 
sensibly be answered without knowing how an increase in the ser-
vice at issue would affect the allocation of resources for other serv-
ices? Permitting these sorts of claims to go forward means that the 
courts, rather than the political branches, are deciding what level 
and distribution of protective services the community will have.138 
136. This assumes, not implausibly, that the legislature intended to establish and fund a 
police force that would act nonnegligently in its interactions with the public. 
137. In this regard, these sorts of failure-to-protect claims are very like governmental 
liability in situations not involving intervening third-party harm. For example, imagine a 
claim against the government for police brutality in which the plaintiff alleges that the police 
officers who arrested him on drug charges caused him to sustain a concussion and two broken 
arms. It is unlikely that these police actions were determined or limited in principal part by 
resource constraints, except in the limited sense that training and supervision costs money. 
Resolution of the claim would not involve the court in reviewing the kind of resource-
allocation decisions implicated by the inadequate-fire-protection claim; the court simply 
would determine whether police officers used a reasonable amount of force under the cir-
cumstances, the sort of question courts are accustomed to resolving. 
138. To give another illustration of the same idea, consider the difference between a 
claim for injuries due to a defective sidewalk and a claim for injuries resulting from failure to 
lay a sidewalk in the first place. The first claim will result in liability if the municipality had 
notice of a significant defect and failed to remedy it. See, e.g., Livings v. City of Chicago, 326 
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There is not, of course, as clear a line as I have drawn between 
claims that raise resource-allocation concerns and those that do not. 
For example, it is at least possible that the police officers who stood 
by and did nothing to aid our hypothetical plaintiff did so because 
the city lacked the money to arm and train them to intervene 
against violent third-party assaults or because they lacked sufficient 
"back-up." Conversely, perhaps there were, in fact, enough avail-
able police officers to patrol the metro station and the surrounding 
area. But, my point is that claims involving general failures to pro-
tect - claims that directly implicate the level of services - are 
more likely than other kinds of claims against the government to 
bump up against the realities of resource limitations. Furthermore, 
because courts are reluctant to interfere with political decisions, the 
likelihood that they will intervene in failure-to-protect cases will be 
quite low when the level of care or services in question is limited by 
scarce public resources. 
Interestingly, while there is a strong argument that courts are 
not very good at monitoring claims involving the "level" of services, 
as opposed to the "quality" of services, there is reason to believe 
that the situation is exactly the opposite when it comes to political 
monitoring: the political process may be better at monitoring the 
level of services than it is at monitoring their quality. It is a well-
accepted justification for permitting certain governmental immuni-
ties that the political process can also serve as an effective check 
against governmental misbehavior. For example, when governmen-
tal officials or employees in their agencies or departments cause 
harm - particularly in these days of extensive media coverage -
the public can exert considerable pressure for offending officials to 
step down or be fired, and elected officials can be voted out of of-
:fice.139 This kind of political pressure would presumably be effec-
tive in controlling harms resulting from both level and quality of 
services. 
N.E.2d 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). See generally 19 McQUILLIN, supra note 73, §§ 54.80-54.80d, 
at 256-68. Liability would require the city reasonably to implement a prior decision by the 
political branches to have a sidewalk in a particular location. Indeed, cities are required to 
close defective public ways if they cannot maintain them nonnegligently, for example, due to 
lack of funding. See id. § 54.23, at 75. By contrast, the second claim would involve the court 
in evaluating political decisions about how much money should be available for sidewalk 
construction (resource allocation at the legislative level) and how those resources ought to be 
allocated among all the possible locations where sidewalks might be needed (resource alloca-
tion at the operational level). Such claims virtually never succeed. See, e.g., Arvel v. City of 
Baton Rouge, 234 So. 2d 458 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 860 
P.2d 336 {Utah 1993). 
139. A full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the political process in monitor-
ing the behavior of governmental officials is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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There is, however, evidence that politicians particularly 
elected officials - get considerably more mileage out of promises 
to increase goods and services than promises to better maintain ex-
isting ones.140 Promises to put more cops on the street or hire more 
teachers for overcrowded public schools are more politically salient 
than simple assurances that existing police officers and teachers \vill 
do a better job. Similarly, there is empirical evidence that govern-
mental agencies tend to neglect maintenance of existing services 
precisely because it is politically less rewarding.141 Agencies have 
greater incentive to add new facilities or programs than to improve 
existing ones because the former is more likely to enable them to 
enlarge their budgets.142 Failure adequately to maintain and super-
vise existing facilities has been shown to be linked to increased lia-
bility costs.143 
Thus, along with the institutional-competence arguments against 
liability in situations that implicate the level of services, damage lia-
bility may also be less important in those situations than in situa-
tions involving negligent delivery of existing services because the 
political process is more likely to serve as an effective monitor 
against governmental misbehavior in the former than in the latter. 
140. See generally Gellis, supra note 114, at 389-90; see also Larry Kramer & Alan 0. 
Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. 
REv. 249, 279 (arguing that because officials are confronted both with demands for increased 
public services and calls for lower truces, they are under pressure to provide higher levels of 
public service at minimum cost). 
141. 
Maintenance is a low visibility service, and empirical evidence supports the theory 
that when a bureau is forced to reduce costs, maintenance will be at the top of its list. 
Maintenance is an operating expense funded out of the current budget for which the 
short-term political rewards are likely to be viewed as less compelling compared with 
those associated with adding new facilities or new programs. 
Gellis, supra note 114, at 390 (footnotes omitted). See generally FRANK LEVY ET AL., URBAN 
OUTCOMES: SCHOOLS, STREETS, AND LIBRARIES 48, 59, 137, 185 (1974) (noting that a study 
of public services - primarily schools and streets - in Oakland, California found that rou-
tine maintenance was the first to suffer when funding cutbacks were made); see also generally 
HERMAN B. LEONARD, CHECKS UNBAIANCED: THE QurnT SIDE OF Punuc SPENDING 169-
75 (1986) (explaining why maintenance of infrastructure is a "no-reward" expenditure for 
public officials). 
142. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 195-99 (1967) (giving rea-
sons for expansionist tendency of agencies and bureaus); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BU-
REAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (arguing that, unlike a private 
firm, the survival of a public bureau depends on the size of its budget, rather than on the 
efficiency of its operations). 
143. See Gellis, supra note '114, at 390 (citing BETIY v AN DER SMISSEN, THE LEGAL 
LIABILITY OF CITIES AND SCHOOLS FOR INJURIES IN RECREATION AND PARKS§ 4.2, at 192 
(1968) (showing the connection between maintenance and liability costs)). 
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C. The Rationale Applied 
The notion that failure-to-protect cases uniquely involve the 
courts in reviewing resource-allocation decisions provides a theo-
retical rationale for the presumptive rule of nonliability, the so-
called public duty rule: state courts invoke the public duty rule 
when liability would involve the court directly in second-guessing 
political decisions about budgetary matters or when the facts or 
context strongly suggest that the level of care that was provided 
resulted from the realities of limited public resources. In other 
words, courts generally decline to entertain individual claims that 
challenge the level or distribution of services or complain that a 
different level or distribution would have prevented some particular 
harm. Implicit in the notion of public duty is the recognition that 
the higher level of services that may have prevented a particular 
harm could mean less of something else and a different - though 
not necessarily superior - distribution of harms. Rather than in-
volving themselves in second-guessing whether the political 
branches got it "right" when they chose a particular use of re-
sources, the courts have chosen to defer to the legislature on such 
matters. 
Thus, the more a plaintiff's theory of liability resembles the first 
claim in Crosland144 - where police officers were on site but failed 
to perform reasonably - the less likely adjudicating the claim 
would involve the court in second-guessing budgetary decisions and 
the more likely liability could result. In doctrinal terms, courts are 
most likely to find a "special relationship" giving rise to liability 
when the government has involved itself in a particular situation to 
such an extent that resource decisions have already been made and 
resources have already been assigned.145 On the other hand, the 
more governmental defendants plausibly can argue that the level of 
care afforded the plaintiff resulted from resource constraints -
Chandler-like cases146 - the less likely the claim will lead to 
liability. 
The notion that courts are not institutionally competent to han-
dle failure-to-protect claims is most powerful in explaining why 
144. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 446 (N.Y. 1989) ("(W]here a 
municipality voluntarily undertakes to act on behalf of a particular citizen who detrimentally 
relies on an illusory promise of protection offered by the municipality, we have permitted 
liability because in such cases the municipality has by its conduct determined how its re-
sources are to be allocated in respect to that circumstance and has thereby created a 'special 
relationship' with the individual seeking protection."). 
146. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
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courts are strongly disinclined to permit liability in most failure-to-
protect cases. It provides a persuasive and normatively defensible 
justification for a rule that is, for other reasons, unappealing. On 
the other hand, resource-allocation concerns only roughly predict 
when the courts will depart from the nonliability rule. As noted 
above, the special relationship cases are less likely to involve the 
courts in reviewing budgetary decisions. But the fact is that failure-
to-protect cases implicate resource-allocation decisions along a con-
tinuum. Thus, while one can predict that claims like the one in 
Chandler will virtually never result in liability and claims like the 
first one in Crosland are more likely to lead to liability, the exact 
boundary line between liability and nonliability remains predictably 
fuzzy. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FAILURE To PROTECT UNDER THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE 
Claims alleging a governmental duty to protect under the Con-
stitution appear to be relatively new.147 For over a decade prior to 
the Court's holding in DeShaney, however, such cases had been 
percolating in the lower federal courts. Significantly, the pattern 
that emerges from the lower court cases is strikingly similar to the 
way state courts have treated analogous cases in tort. The pre-
sumptive rule in the constitutional cases as in the tort context is that 
there is no liability for governmental failure to protect. 
This Part outlines the range of failure-to-protect claims that 
have been brought under the Due Process Clause and how the 
courts have handled such claims. A discussion of each category 
shows how concerns about resource allocation help to explain the 
courts' approach to liability. 
147. Constitutional duty-to-protect cases trace their roots back to the 1976 case of Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that the government owes a 
duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from certain injuries while in cus-
tody. Later, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), and City of Revere v. Massachu-
setts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983), the Court held that the government owes a 
similar duty of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to involuntarily committed 
mental patients and pretrial detainees, respectively. The Court first considered a claim of 
failure to protect outside the custodial setting in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), 
a case against the government for the release of a parolee who subsequently killed plaintiff's 
decedent. The Court dismissed the case on the grounds that there was no causation but left 
open the possibility that, under other circumstances, such a Fourteenth Amendment right 
might be upheld. See 444 U.S. at 284-85. Lower court cases prior to DeShaney involving 
noncustodial failure-to-protect claims under the Fourteenth Amendment relied on Martinez. 
See generally Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 
1052 (1985). 
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The claims fall along a continuum roughly correlated with the 
extent of governmental involvement in the events giving rise to the 
harm: at one end of the spectrum are situations in which the gov-
ernment allegedly had reason to know of a particular risk of injury 
but no ongoing relationship with the potential victim. There is al-
most never liability in such cases. At the other end are cases in 
which the plaintiff was injured - for example, by another prisoner 
- while in custody, the one situation where liability is clearly per-
mitted under DeShaney. A middle category of claims, where failure 
to protect may or may not lead to liability, involves situations in 
which governmental actors arguably have contributed in some way 
to the risk of harm. 
A. General Failures To Protect - No Liability 
Claims at one end of the continuum involve allegations that gov-
ernmental actors failed to provide protection against a risk of harm 
that they knew or should have known existed. The cases take a 
variety of forms from a general allegation of failure to enforce the 
laws to a single, unaddressed call for help, to a claim of reliance on 
explicit or implicit governmental assurances of help. Such claims 
almost never give rise to liability. 
There are relatively few cases seeking damages for general fail-
ures to enforce the law or general failures to protect from the risk 
of harm. Such cases raise issues of resource allocation in the 
starkest form. For example, in Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 148 
plaintiff was shot during a robbery at a store where she was shop-
ping. Plaintiff alleged that the government had failed to protect her 
by its policy of responding only when a crime actually had been 
committed149 and by providing inadequate police protection in a 
high crime area. This case is just another version of Chandler;15D . 
litigation of the claim would require the court to consider both 
whether the total number of police officers was adequate for the 
city's needs (resource allocation at the legislative level) and 
whether the city's allocation of officers among the various needs in 
the community was appropriate (resource allocation at the opera-
tional level). As noted above, the courts have no institutional ad-
148. 471 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
149. The facts recited by the district court suggest that the police never actually received 
a call for help from plaintiff or anyone else. See 471 F. Supp. at 1264. 
150. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
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vantage over the political process in assessing how available 
resources ought to be allocated.151 
There are any number of such cases in which resource-allocation 
issues are even closer to the surface: for example, in Dollar v. 
Haralson County,152 plaintiff, whose children drowned while she 
was attempting to cross a rain-swollen ford, brought suit against the 
county for failing to build a bridge across the ford.153 The County 
Commissioner testified at trial that building a bridge over that par-
ticular ford was one of his "top priorities."154 According to the 
Commissioner, however, it was county policy to wait for a state con-
tract rather than spend local revenue on bridges.155 The thrust of 
plaintiff's claim was that the county was negligent in failing to 
spend local funds to build the bridge.156 It is hard to imagine a 
clearer case of judicial review of budgetary decisions. 
Cases involving injuries allegedly caused by governmental fail-
ures to enforce state or local laws raise similar issues. For example, 
in California First Bank v. State, 151 plaintiffs alleged that injuries 
they sustained in an automobile accident resulted from police fail-
ure to enforce liquor control laws and drunk driving laws at certain 
"Indian Bars" that were notorious for excessive drinking. The in-
toxicated driver of the automobile that collided with plaintiffs' car 
had been drinking at one of the unregulated bars on the night in 
151. In a case raising similar issues, Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984), plain-
tiffs sought damages for governmental failure to prevent their children's deaths in an apart-
ment fire. The deaths occurred during a firefighters' strike in which the city had closed a 
firehouse near plaintiffs' apartment building. See 738 F.2d at 1444-45. Thirteen minutes after 
the fire was detected a fire truck from a manned firehouse arrived and extinguished the 
blaze. See 738 F.2d at 1445. The case differs from Chandler in that picketing fire fighters 
who detected the fire were prevented by police guarding the nearby firehouse from gaining 
access to fire-fighting equipment. The decision to prevent access to certain firehouses was, 
however, clearly part of the city's strategy for conserving resources and protecting public 
property during the strike. {There was no evidence that police obstructed the efforts of res-
cuers to reach the burning building.) The court held the government not liable for the chil-
dren's deaths. See 738 F.2d at 1448; see also McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 
(5th Cir. 1989) {finding no liability for failure to arrest a third party who subsequently injured 
plaintiff), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990); Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1516 
(11th Cir. 1983) {finding no liability when a rape victim claimed that the city had failed to 
protect her by suppressing information about the number of rapes that had occurred in the 
city); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding no governmental liability 
to family of a victim killed by a mental patient who was released despite having committed 
an earlier killing and having been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity). 
152. 704 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983). 
153. See 704 F.2d at 1541. 
154. See 704 F.2d at 1542. 
155. See 704 F.2d at 1542. 
156. The Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict finding the county negligent on plain-
tiff's theory. See 704 F.2d at 1544. 
157. 801 P.2d 646 (N.M. 1990). 
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question.158 This claim is obviously problematic from a resource 
perspective: the level of law enforcement that is possible, like the 
level of police protection in Reiff, is a direct function of the amount 
of resources allocated to the agency responsible for that function. 
A court called upon to answer the question whether there has been 
adequate enforcement of the laws cannot escape the necessity of 
reviewing the level and distribution of law-enforcement 
resources.159 
A large number of cases in this category involve unanswered 
calls for help rather than general failures to protect. For example, 
the courts consistently have denied claims of failure to respond to a 
call or request for fire160 or police protection161 or for other emer-
gency services.162 Even when governmental officials have had 
158. See 801 P.2d at 648. 
159. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1993) {finding no 
liability when plaintiff who sustained injuries in an accident caused by an epileptic driver 
sued the government for alleged failure to investigate and report accidents with epileptic 
drivers), cert. denied, 114 S. a. 1218 {1994); Edwards'v. Johnston County Health Dept., 885 
F.2d 1215, 1225 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding no liability for governmental failure to enforce state 
and federal migrant-housing statutes); Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 
1982) (finding no liability for failure to enforce train-speed ordinance); Baugh v. City of 
Milwaukee, 823 F. Supp. 1452, 1466-67 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (finding no liability for deaths by 
fire when city allegedly failed properly to inspect apartment building for smoke alarms), 
affd., 41 F.3d 1510 (7th Cir. 1994); Crosby v. Luzerne County Hous. Auth., 739 F. Supp. 951, 
952, 956 (M.D. Pa.) (finding no liability for injuries to plaintiff's son, who was unable to 
escape from third floor of burning building, when local officials had inspected premises and 
permitted use of "fire ladder" that did not meet requirements under applicable state regula-
tions), affd., 919 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1990); Wright v. Bailey, 611 So. 2d 300, 302, 306 (Ala. 1992) 
(finding no liability for death of plaintiff's wife in a two-car accident when government alleg-
edly permitted the other driver, who was intoxicated, to get into his car and drive in order to 
enhance the charges against him). 
160. See, e.g., Shortino v. Wheeler, 531 F.2d 938, 939 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding no liability 
for alleged inadequate fire protection throughout Kansas City, Missouri); Westbrook v. City 
of Jackson, 772 F. Supp. 932, 942-43 (S.D. Miss. 1991) {finding a municipality not liable for 
failure to provide fire protection due to inadequate water supply to property recently an-
nexed to city); Wooters v. Jomlin, 477 F. Supp. 1140, 1148-50 (D. Del. 1979) (rejecting the 
argument that certain state and county laws had created a property interest in the provision 
of governmental services), affd., 622 F.2d 580 {3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980); 
Reedy v. Mullins, 456 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (W.D. Va. 1978) (finding no general right to 
adequate fire protection and rejecting the argument that vague contract with city based on 
payment of taxes created property right in adequate fire protection). 
161. See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392-94 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding 
no liability for police failure to protect when gunman entered a post office and started shoot-
ing); Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that members of general 
public have no constitutional right to be protected by the state against harm inflicted by third 
parties); McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding no liability for failure to 
act); Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no duty to intervene when 
general public is imperiled); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 
1990) (finding that a state's Protection from Abuse Act did not create property interest 
under the Due Process Clause). 
162. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that 
failure of the city to send an ambulance driver to the home of a hyperventilating woman who 
later died did not violate due process), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Wideman v. Shal-
1020 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:982 
ongoing contact with an individual through repeated calls for help 
or prior responses to such calls, courts - well before DeShaney -
denied liability for governmental failure to prevent injury-causing 
behavior. For example, prior to DeShaney, only one court had held 
social workers liable for injuries to a child not in state-sponsored 
foster care.163 On the other hand, in the domestic violence context, 
the results - both before and after DeShaney - are more mixed; 
cases permitting liability for failure to protect have generally in-
volved repeated complaints of threatened or actual violence cou-
pled with the failure to enforce a restraining order against the 
abusive spouse.164 
lowford Community Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding no liability when 
ambulance drivers refused to take pregnant woman to certain hospital}; Handley v. City of 
Seagoville, 798 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (N.D. Tex. 1992} (finding no liability for failure to provide 
ambulance service when requested}; Hendon v. DeKalb County, 417 S.E.2d 705, 712 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1992) (finding no liability to stroke victim for failure to respond to 911 call}; Doe v. 
Calumet City, 609 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no liability for failure to 
respond to 911 call}; CUiver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231, 
1234 (Ind. 1994) (finding no municipal liability for actions of city ambulance service in re-
sponse to emergency call}. 
163. See Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 511 (3d Cir. 1985); 
see also Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1984} (finding no clearly established 
right of protection owed to children not in foster care but noting that special relationship 
could arise under certain circumstances}, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). But see Milburn 
v. Anne Arundel County Dept of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding no 
liability for alleged failure to report abuse and to remove child from abusive foster home); 
Harpole v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no liability 
for injuries to child being monitored by social services). Cases after DeShaney have denied 
governmental liability for failure to prevent the abuse of children being followed by social 
services but not in foster care. See, e.g., McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990); Edwards v. Johnston City Health 
Dept., 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1989); Sapp v. Cunningham, 847 F. Supp. 893 (D. Wyo. 1994); 
Burke v. Sheboygan County Human Servs., 790 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Chrissy F. v. 
Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 780 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1991}, cert. denied sub nom. 
Chrissy F. v. Dale, 114 S. Ct. 1336 (1994); see also Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991} (finding no liability for failure to provide adequate 
information to adoptive parents). Some courts have held the government liable for injuries 
to children in state-sponsored foster care. See infra note 198. 
164. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), revd. in 
light o/DeShaney, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 
849 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Most failure-to-protect claims involving domestic violence after 
DeShaney have not resulted in liability, even when the claim alleged failure to enforce a 
protective order. See, e.g., Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Dawson v. Milwaukee Hous. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1991}; Brown v. Grabowski, 922 
F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991}; Coffman v. \Vtlson Police Dept., 
739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 
1990); Duong v. County of Arapahoe, 837 P.2d 226 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Ashby v. City of 
Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992). But see Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding liability when defendant police officer was friend of attacker); Pinder 
v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376, 395 (D. Md. 1993) (finding liability when 
the government promised plaintiff that defendant-attacker would remain in jail but then re-
leased him}; Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. Ohio 1991} (finding that 
protective order created property right in abused spouse to be protected from domestic vio-
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Cases involving unanswered calls for help are more difficult be-
cause they implicate two possible underlying stories, one of which 
appears not to raise resource-allocation concems.165 To illustrate, 
imagine a version of Reiff166 in which a store employee called the 
police to report that he had seen a suspicious individual enter the 
store with what looked like a gun hidden under his coat. The police 
fail to respond to the call, and plaintiff is injured in the ensuing 
robbery. She brings a due process claim against the municipality 
for its failure to respond to the call for assistance in a timely man-
ner. Plaintiff also challenges the police department's policy not to 
respond to calls for assistance unless or until a crime actually has 
been committed. 
Police failure to respond here implicates two possible stories of 
governmental behavior or misbehavior: one possibility is that the 
failure to respond resulted from shirking by individual governmen-
tal actors. For example, maybe police officers failed to respond be-
cause the police dispatcher neglected to communicate information 
to the appropriate persons or gave responding officers the wrong 
address. An equally plausible story, however, is that the officers' 
failure to respond resulted from institutional constraints or choices. 
For example, suppose police officers were unable to follow up on 
the call because they were compelled to place their priorities on 
other, more serious reports or to choose among many calls for 
assistance. In turn, the officers' need to set priorities is traceable to 
the realities of limited resources, budgetary constraints, and result-
ing institutional-level decisions about staffing and workloads. In 
that regard, it is quite likely that the police department's policy of 
placing first priority on calls for assistance when a crime has been 
committed is its way of responding to the reality of more calls than 
available officers can accommodate. Moreover, when the claim is 
simply that government officials failed to respond to a known risk 
of harm, it may be difficult or impossible to determine whether the 
injury resulted from individual behavior or systemic constraints or, 
most likely, a combination of the two. 
The notion that there are two plausible stories behind these 
sorts of injury-producing failures to protect - and that one story 
lence but that police did not violate this right because they made reasonable efforts to protect 
her). 
165. Cases involving general failures to protect theoretically could implicate two stories 
as well; but the "misbehavior" story is more difficult to make out when no identifiable gov-
ernmental agent has been involved with the injured plaintiff. 
166. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. 
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involves the realities of institutional limitations - has important 
implications for liability. If the government's account strongly sug-
gests that a resource-allocation story is behind an injury-causing 
failure to protect, the courts will be reluctant to entertain a claim 
against the government.167 
To see why this makes DeShaney a harder case, consider again 
the facts of that case: plaintiff, the mother of a child who is being 
followed by a social worker, sues the government for failure to re-
move her child from the custody of her abusive ex-husband. Plain-
tiff argues that the social worker ignored evidence of child abuse 
contained in the child's file. At first glance, this case looks a lot like 
the metro-station hypothetical in which governmental officials were 
already "on the scene" and failed to intervene: the social worker 
apparently had committed the government's resources to following 
this particular child. She had made multiple visits to the child's 
home, taken copious notes about his situation, and indicated her 
clear impression that he was at risk. Yet the social worker failed to 
act in the face of significant evidence suggesting child abuse. View-
ing these facts in isolation, DeShaney seems to be wrongly decided; 
it appears that the social worker acted negligently, if not recklessly, 
toward the risk of harm to this child. 
It would be misleading, however, to view the social worker's be-
havior in isolation; her actions as to this child cannot fairly be as-
sessed without reference to the whole range of serious cases she 
was currently monitoring. One can imagine what the social worker 
might say if she were called upon to defend her actions: she ex-
plains that, at the same time she was following Joshua DeShaney, 
she had 100 other children in her caseload. By definition, all of 
these children were at some significant risk of serious injury; the 
differences among them were only a matter of degree. Of these 100 
children, she estimates that at least twenty had situations at least as 
serious as Joshua's.16s 
167. It is not necessary to distinguish entity liability from individual-officer liability in this 
regard. In the event that injured victims pursue a judgment against the individual officer 
rather than the "deep pocket" governmental defendant, most states provide some form of 
indemnification against adverse judgments or settlements. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, 
Sumo GOVERNMENT 85-88 {1983). Thus, the burden of liability will ultimately fall upon the 
governmental entity. 
168. These numbers are not unrealistic. Many caseworkers are required to carry much 
higher caseloads than they realistically can manage. In a District of Columbia case, one so-
cial worker testified that she was responsible for 69 families and 251 children, down from a 
high of 131 families and over 300 children. See LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 978 
(D.D.C. 1991). To comply with state and federal Jaw applicable to the District of Columbia, a 
social worker should have a maximum of only 20-40 families. 
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The social worker's defense is that she did the best she could -
indeed, that she acted nonnegligently - given the range of her 
caseload and the resources available to her. Determining when to 
remove children from abusive homes is not an exact science; it may 
not be clear whether or not interventions short of removal are 
bringing about change and when the risk of injury has reached a 
crucial point. In addition, monitoring such situations is incredibly 
resource intensive, involving multiple visits, consultations, family 
counseling, and intermediate interventions. Moreover, a decision 
to separate a child from parental custody obviously has its own 
costs. Given that context, the level of care that plausibly can be 
tendered to any individual child by the social worker is significantly 
limited by the demands her total caseload places upon her, which in 
turn is a function of the resources allocated to child-protective serv-
ices by the political process. What looks on its face like gross negli-
gence or worse may look quite different when the social worker's 
broader responsibilities are considered. 
But why couldn't the court consider whether the social worker 
acted reasonably in light of these resource constraints? A judge sen-
sitive to budgetary issues could use qualified immunity or the due 
process requirement that defendant's actions be more than negli-
gent to separate out cases with a plausible resource-allocation 
story.169 Indeed, it is implicit in my argument here that courts were 
able to get to the "proper" results in resource-allocation terms even 
before the Supreme Court's categorical rejection of failure-to-
protect claims in DeShaney. If so, why have a blanket rule against 
failure-to-protect claims? 
I address that question more fully in discussing the Supreme 
Court's narrow holding in DeShaney.170 One possible difficulty 
with a "resource-allocation defense," however, is that it would not 
entirely avoid judicial second-guessing. For example, the social 
worker with a resource-allocation story would have to explain her 
interventions and noninterventions in her other cases in order to 
justify her actions in the situation giving rise to the suit. We might 
worry that such an inquiry gets the court right back into the busi-
ness of reviewing decisions about resource allocation and distribu-
169. There is also reason to think that the "custom or policy" analysis applicable to mu-
nicipal liability could be sensitive to resource-allocation issues. See City of Canton v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (holding that claims against a municipality for inadequate training 
require a showing of deliberate indifference in order to avoid judicial "second-guessing [of] 
municipal employee-training programs"). 
170. See infra notes 196-236 and accompanying text. 
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tion,171 the very inquiry it is seeking to avoid. Similarly, it is not 
clear that a threshold fault standard - something like "deliberate 
indifference" - is well-suited to separate out cases involving re-
source constraints. For example, suppose the court adopted an 
objective fault standard: the operative question could be whether 
the risk of serious harm to a particular individual was so great that 
the social worker's failure to intervene should be considered blame-
worthy, notwithstanding her caseload. That standard would not 
necessarily identify governmental behavior constrained by resource 
limitations: by definition, the conscientious-but-overworked social 
worker likely would have files evidencing substantial risks of seri-
ous harm to children but be unable, through no fault of her own, to 
address all such cases.112 
Putting aside for the moment the question why the Supreme 
Court apparently chose a categorical rule rather than case-by-case 
adjudication, my point here is that DeShaney is a much harder case 
than its critics acknowledge. Because the social-work context, al-
most by definition, will involve more cases of possible child abuse 
or neglect than plausibly can be addressed, the line between claims 
that raise resource-allocation concerns and those that do not is diffi-
cult to draw. That is exactly what makes DeShaney hard. It is, on 
the one hand, not an "easy" case for nonliability, as if it had in-
volved a single report of child abuse that went uninvestigated or a 
claim that more social workers should have been assigned to a par-
ticular neighborhood. As noted earlier, these sorts of claims rarely 
result in liability because they raise the most serious resource-
allocation issues. But DeShaney is also not simply a case where so-
cial workers "on the scene" stood by and failed to intervene. The 
picture is much more complicated. The social worker was "on the 
scene," so to speak, of many potentially abusive situations involving 
many at-risk children. In order to evaluate the reasonableness of 
her behavior toward one child, one would want to know more 
171. Judicial reluctance to do this kind of review seems to have influenced the doctrine of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity in suits alleging malicious prosecution: it would be difficult 
or impossible to show malice in such cases without reviewing the prosecutor's decisionmak-
ing process, including past cases that she chose not to prosecute. Although this idea does not 
often appear in the literature, colleagues who teach criminal procedure have identified this 
notion as one strand of the rationale for prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., United States v. 
Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299-300 (9th Cir. 1992). 
172. One could defend the objective fault rule on normative grounds as simply a way of 
defining the minimal standard necessary to satisfy the demands of the Constitution, regard-
less of resulting budgetary implications. Indeed, courts are fond of saying that lack of funds 
is no excuse for unconstitutional governmental actions. That begs the question, however, of 
what exactly the Constitution requires in this class of cases. 
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about her obligations and behavior in connection with these other 
cases as well. 
My point, then, is that cases like DeShaney, which might seem 
clear when viewed in isolation, are more difficult when viewed in 
the broader context in which there are countless demands on gov-
ernmental resources, and street-level officials must make choices 
among them. 
B. Failures To Protect in the Noncustodial Setting - Liability? 
In contrast to the cases cited above, there is a category of cases 
in which the lower federal courts - both before and after 
DeShaney113 - have been willing to entertain duty-to-protect 
claims, whether or not governmental officials ultimately are found 
to have violated that duty. These cases arise out of a wide variety 
of fact patterns. But what they have in common is that they are less 
likely to require the courts to engage in a review of resource-
allocation decisions than the general failure-to-protect cases dis-
cussed above. 
Consider, for example, the following pair of cases alleging gov-
ernmental failure to protect from death by drowning. In Ross v. 
United States, 114 plaintiffs brought a due process claim against the 
City of Waukegan and the County of Lake City, Illinois in connec-
tion with the death of their twelve-year-old son who had fallen off a 
breakwater into Lake Michigan and drowned. Plaintiffs alleged 
that a deputy county sheriff had deprived their son of a liberty in-
terest by preventing available private divers from attempting a res-
cue.115 County divers who were authorized to carry out the rescue 
did not arrive until twenty minutes after the private rescuers had 
made themselves available.176 The Court of Appeals permitted the 
due process claim to go forward against the County and the Deputy 
173. After DeShaney - and despite language that could be read to foreclose failure-to-
protect liability except in the custodial setting - courts have continued to pennit liability in 
a subset of noncustodial cases. Courts have relied on the DeShaney Court's rationale for 
finding no liability in that case - that the government had played no part in creating the 
dangers that caused Joshua's injuries or in rendering him any more vulnerable to them, see 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) - to justify 
liability when governmental officials allegedly have played a part in creating or increasing the 
risk of injury to plaintiff. See, e.g., Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1993}; Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 
583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989). 
174. 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990). 
175. The Deputy Sheriff apparently was following an explicit county policy prohibiting 
civilians from attempting rescues under any circumstances. See 910 F.2d at 1425. 
176. See 910 F.2d at 1425. 
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Sheriff. In Andrews v. Wilkins, 177 plaintiffs sued the U.S. Park 
Police178 in connection with the drowning death of their son, who 
had plunged into the Potomac River in an attempt to flee from offi-
cials threatening to arrest him for urinating in public. Police of-
ficers made several attempts to toss the young man a life ring and 
directed a private boat to go alongside him, but they also directed 
the occupants of the boat - who apparently were trained swim-
mers - not to go in after the young man.119 The court rejected 
plaintiffs' due process claim that the Park Police had a duty to res-
cue their son from drowning.180 The court apparently deemed cog-
nizable plaintiffs' claim that officials had interfered with private 
rescuers, but it ultimately concluded that park officials had acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.181 
· What is significant about these two cases is that the claims the 
courts permitted do not implicate the kinds of resource-allocation 
concerns raised by general failure-to-protect claims: plaintiffs 
claimed that governmental officials on the scene behaved badly by 
restraining private rescuers from giving aid. Adjudicating that 
claim does not require the court to evaluate either the adequacy of 
the overall level of services (resource allocation at the legislative 
level) or the appropriateness of the distribution of those services 
among competing uses (resource allocation at the operational 
level). Rather, it calls upon the court to assess the appropriateness 
of governmental behavior after officials on the scene had under-
taken certain actions toward the respective plaintiffs. That is ex-
actly the kind of judgment that courts are accustomed to making. 
In Ross, the court concluded that the officials had behaved reck-
lessly in the face of an obvious risk of danger,182 while the court in 
Andrews concluded that those officials had behaved reasonably 
under the circumstances.1s3 
177. 934 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
178. Plaintiffs' claim was brought against federal officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) 
on the theory that they were acting under color of state law at the time of the injury. See 934 
F2d at 1269. 
179. See 934 F2d at 1269. 
180. See 934 F.2d at 1270. 
181. See 934 F.2d at 1271. 
182. In Ross, the court noted that county officials failed to inquire whether the private 
rescuers were qualified to attempt a rescue, even when it became apparent that the govern-
mental rescuers were not going to arrive in time to save the child's life. See Ross v. United 
States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1990). 
183. The Andrews court distinguished Ross on the grounds that both the officers' behav-
ior and the underlying circumstances were materially different in the two cases. For example, 
the court noted that, in Andrews, police officers were reasonable in discouraging the private 
rescuers because the officers had no way of assessing the rescuers' level of skill, and - given 
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The largest category of cases that has given rise to liability in-
volves situations where, according to the courts, the government 
recklessly or willfully has exposed plaintiffs to an increased risk of 
danger. For example, there are a number of cases involving injuries 
to passengers after traffic stops in which police arrest or detain the 
driver. In the seminal pre-DeShaney case, White v. ·Rochford,184 the 
court entertained a due process claim for injuries to child passen-
gers who suffered injury when they were left alone in a car on a 
busy highway after the driver was arrested for drag racing. Simi-
larly, in Wood v. Ostrander,185 a post-Deshaney case, the court per-
mitted a claim by a plaintiff who was raped when police allegedly 
left her stranded in a high-crime district after the companion with 
whom she had been riding was arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated, and the car was impounded.186 Like the claims in Ross and 
Andrews, abandoned-passenger claims permit the court to consider 
the limited question of whether governmental officials acted rea-
sonably in their actual encounter with the later-injured plaintiff; 
they do not require the court to inquire into the level and distribu-
tion of governmental services.187 
the victim's bizarre behavior - police reasonably thought he could have been dangerous. 
See Andrews, 934 F2d at 1271; see also Franklin v. City of Boise, 806 F. Supp. ITT9, 888 (D. 
Idaho 1992) (finding police officers acted reasonably in prohibiting an intoxicated private 
rescuer from diving after an individual who fell into a pond and drowned while resisting 
arrest). 
184. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). Even judges who are generally hostile to duty-to-
protect claims have indicated their agreement with White. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 
847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (Judge Easterbrook}, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); 
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) (Judge Posner), cerL denied, 465 
U.S. 1049 (1984). 
185. ITT9 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). 
186. A number of jurisdictions have rejected such claims after DeShaney. For example, 
in Hilliard v. City of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1013 (1991), the 
court found no liability when a woman was robbed and sexually assaulted by a third party 
after the intoxicated driver of the car in which she had been traveling was arrested, and his 
car was impounded. Hilliard cannot readily be distinguished from Ostrander on factual 
grounds nor on grounds that it raises greater concerns about resource allocation. The court 
found DeShaney controlling and held that no duty to protect in that situation was "clearly 
established." See 930 F.2d at 1520. In two other cases, the courts apparently concluded that 
governmental officials behaved reasonably under clear law. See Walton v. City of Southfield, 
995 F.2d 1331, 1339 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that no clearly established law was violated when 
police officers permitted a fifteen-year-old and a two-year-old to find their own way home 
after officers arrested their grandmother, who had been driving the car); Sewell v. Van Buren 
Township Police Dept., 806 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-21 (E.D. Mich. 1992} (finding no clearly 
established law violated when plaintiff, who was suffering from delusions, was arrested, re-
leased, and later injured while wandering down the median of an interstate highway as she 
attempted to walk home). 
187. See, e.g., Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1122 (7th Cir. 1993) (permitting liability when 
police left intoxicated passenger in car after arresting driver, after which passenger drove off 
and caused an accident that injured plaintiff); Russell v. Steck, 851 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ohio 
1994) (permitting a due process claim when police officers insisted that plaintiff, who had 
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Another group of cases in which the courts have permitted lia-
bility for failure to protect includes ones loosely characterized by 
the fact that governmental officials are actually and purposejUlly on 
the scene before the injury-causing events take place. For example, 
in Dwares v. City of New York, 188 the court upheld a due process 
claim by an individual who was injured by skinheads while partici-
pating in a flag-burning demonstration. The court noted that, 
although police had no general duty to protect plaintiff based on 
past incidents of violence by skinheads, a duty arose where the at-
tack occurred in the presence of police officers who had promised 
the skinheads that they would not intervene unless things "got out 
of control."189 The court permitted only plaintiff's claim that gov-
ernmental officials on the scene willfully failed to intervene to pre-
vent ongoing harm. That claim did not involve the court in 
reviewing the level or distribution of police services; it merely re-
quired the court to consider the behavior of officers who were al-
ready on the scene performing the duties of their governmental 
offices. 
Not all officer-on-the-scene cases, however, have resulted in 
governmental liability. For example, in Tucker v. Callahan,190 the 
court did not permit a due process claim against a police officer 
who sat in his police car while a man was beaten in a hotel parking 
lot across the street. The court held that the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the mere fact that the officer was on the 
scene and observed the beating did not create a duty under clearly 
established law.191 Under my positive analysis of failure-to-protect 
cases, this result seems clearly wrong: the case does not appear to 
raise resource-allocation concerns. Plaintiff does not allege that 
there should have been more officers on hand, and there is no sug-
gestion that the officer failed to intervene because he was engaged 
in other police activities. Moreover, unlike in many such cases, 
become disorderly at a hotel, get into his car and exit the premises despite evidence - and 
over his objections - that he was too intoxicated to drive); Estate ofTtttiger v. Doering, 678 
F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (permitting a due process claim for death of passenger who 
was killed when police stopped the car in which he had been riding, gave the teenage driver a 
number of sobriety tests, and then insisted that the intoxicated passenger ride his bicycle 
home at night with no lights rather than ride home with his intoxicated friend). But see 
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no liability when police 
detained "designated driver" on outstanding traffic warrant, and passengers - who unbe-
knownst to police were also intoxicated - were injured when they attempted to drive them-
selves home), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1265 (1993). 
188. 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993). 
189. See 985 F.2d at 97, 99. 
190. 867 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1989). 
191. See 867 F.2d at 914. 
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there is no factual discussion in Tucker suggesting that the officer's 
nonliability turned on a lack of the requisite intent; the court simply 
fails to inquire into the "misbehavior" story at all.192 
On the other hand, Tucker may illustrate the difficulty of mak-
ing case-by case determinations on resource-allocation grounds. 
The court apparently was reluctant to open the door to such inquir-
ies by holding that the mere observation of harm-causing behavior 
automatically gives rise to a duty to protect: an officer who hap-
pens to arrive on the scene where an injury is occurring - as op-
posed to being there by design as in Dwares - may not be much 
different from an official who receives a call for help or has knowl-
edge of possible harm.193 At the very least, one would want more 
information about what the officer in Tucker was doing while the 
beating was going on and what reasons he may have had for his 
failure to intervene.194 
In sum, concerns about judicial review of resource allocations 
are most powerful in accounting for the strong presumptive rule 
against liability in failure-to-protect cases. The question whether 
adjudicating particular claims would involve the courts in such re-
view is also useful in predicting what sorts of failure-to-protect 
claims are most likely to result in governmental liability.19s 
192. By contrast, in Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544 {7th Cir. 1991), the 
court found no liability when plaintiff's decedent was murdered in the presence of a deputy 
sheriff who had accompanied her to a meeting with her estranged husband. Although the 
court's analysis, citing DeShaney, centers around the absence of a duty to protect, it appears 
from the court's detailed presentation of the facts that the deputy's actions at most were 
grossly negligent. See 946 F.2d at 550. 
193. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 
F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding a police officer not liable for failing to determine 
whether anyone was still inside a burning automobile when the officer arrived at the scene of 
an accident), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). 
194. Cf. Rogers v. City of Port Huron, 833 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Mich. 1993) {finding no 
liability for injuries to an intoxicated man who was hit by a car after police left him on a 
grassy area of lawn by the curb). Courts have avoided Tucker-like claims on a number of 
grounds: for example, that plaintiffs failed to show causation, see, e.g., Beard v. O'Neal, 728 
F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding FBI informant who was with a police officer when he car-
ried out a contract killing not liable for failing to prevent the murder), or failed to prove that 
governmental officials had the requisite intent. See, e.g., Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 
F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding undercover police officers, who happened to be in a bar 
when a fight broke out, not liable for failure to prevent a shooting). 
195. It might be objected that what really explain"S the line between liability and nonlia-
bility in failure-to-protect cases is that courts permit liability when governmental officials act 
in bad faith. That explanation would mean that none of the general failure-to-protect cases, 
including cases involving unanswered calls for help, involves bad faith. But there is no reason 
to think that general failures to protect never involve some element of bad faith. Rather, 
courts appear unwilling even to consider the question of bad faith where resource-allocation 
issues are significantly implicated. 
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C. Failure To Protect in the Custodial Setting - Liability 
Virtually every court of appeals that has considered the issue 
has held that there is a duty under the Due Process Clause to pro-
tect individuals whom the government has placed in custody,196 and 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that conclusion in DeShaney.191 
One reading of DeShaney would preclude liability except in the cus-
todial setting and perhaps in circumstances closely analogous to 
custody, such as foster care.198 As noted above, however, the lower 
courts have continued to permit liability in situations not remotely 
custodial.199 I have argued that courts have allowed these cases to 
196. See, e.g., Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Fauver v. Ryan, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (finding that a pretrial detainee has clearly established 
right to safe environment and not to be housed with dangerous inmate); Withers v. Levine, 
615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.) (finding a duty to protect prison inmates from a known risk of harm 
from sexual assaults by other inmates), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Spence v. Staras, 507 
F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Merideth v. Grogan, 812 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (finding a 
duty to protect a person in custody with known suicidal tendencies from risk of suicide), affd., 
985 F.2d 579 (11th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 728 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Pa. 
1990) (finding that an intoxicated pretrial detainee was entitled to at least the same level of 
care as a convicted prisoner), affd., 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 
(1992); Gann v. Delaware State Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 268 (D. Del. 1982) (finding that the state 
has a duty to provide for the reasonable safety of an involuntarily committed patient in a 
state mental hospital); see also Strauss, supra note 8, at 67. 
197. See DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). 
198. See 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. A number of lower courts, both before and after DeShaney, 
have permitted liability for injuries to children in government-mandated foster care when 
governmental officials were "deliberately indifferent" to the risk of harm to the child. See, 
e.g., Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. 
New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 
846 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied sub nom. Ledbetter v. Taylor, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. New York Dept. of 
Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 
U.S. 864 (1983); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303 (D.N.H. 1994); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. 
Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1993); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991); B.H. v. 
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). After DeShaney, some courts have disposed of 
the cases on qualified immunity grounds, holding that a right to protection while in foster 
care was not clearly established. See, e.g., Estate of Cooper ex rel. Cotturo v. Montgomery 
County Office of Children & Youth, 1993 WL 477084 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd., 30 F.3d 1485 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Eugene D. ex rel Olivia D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 931 (1990); Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 
(1990); Coker ex rel Coker v. Henry, 813 F. Supp. 567 (W.D. Mich. 1993), affd., 25 F.3d 1047 
(6th Cir. 1994); Lintz v. Skipski, 807 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1992), affd., 25 F.3d 304 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994). A few courts have distinguished cases involving 
voluntary foster care as not giving rise to a governmental duty of protection. See, e.g., 
Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd., 966 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
199. See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text. A large number of jurisdictions have 
considered and rejected the claim that students in public schools are in custody within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 991 
(10th Cir. 1994) (finding school officials not liable for injuries to students by fellow students); 
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding school officials not 
liable for sexual assault of mentally retarded boy by another student in the boys' shower); 
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go forward because they tend not to involve judicial second-
guessing of budgetary decisions. But how shall we understand the 
Supreme Court's focus on custody as the determining factor in 
failure-to-protect cases? 
When DeShaney came before the Supreme Court, the Court al-
ready had recognized in Revere200 and Youngberg201 a duty to pro-
tect pretrial detainees and involuntary mental patients, respectively, 
under the Due Process Clause. These cases extended the duty of 
protection owed to prisoners under the Eighth Amendment202 to 
individuals in other custodial settings. In the wake of these hold-
ings and relying on certain language from the Court's analysis in 
Martinez v. California, 203 a number of jurisdictions had begun to 
extend the duty to protect to certain noncustodial situations. In 
particular, one line of cases held that, once the government learns a 
third party poses a particular danger to an identified victim and in-
dicates its intention to protect against that danger, a "special rela-
tionship"204 arises between the government and the potential 
victim, creating a duty to protect enforceable under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.205 The Supreme Court in DeShaney rejected the 
Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding school officials not liable for 
choking death of child in cloakroom of school}, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); D.R. v. 
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding compul-
sory school attendance is not analogous to custody, and state did not create or increase the 
danger giving rise to the injury), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993). But see Waechter v. 
School Dist., 773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (denying dismissal of due process claim 
when student died of cardiac arrhythmia following "gut run" imposed by teacher as punish-
ment); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying motion 
to dismiss when plaintiff had suffered 17 incidents of physical and mental injury by other 
students, and school officials failed to end the abuse). 
200. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983). 
201. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
202. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
203. 444 U.S. 277, rehg. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). In Martinez, the Court ultimately 
rejected a claim seeking to hold the government liable under the Due Process Clause for the 
death of a citizen at the hands of a parolee. The Court decided the case on causation grounds 
without facing the constitutional issue. The Court, however, left open the question whether a 
parole officer could, under some circumstances, be held liable for the injury-causing behavior 
of a parolee. The Court noted that in the extant case "the parole board was not aware that 
[the victim] faced any special danger." 444 U.S. at 285. 
204. The scope of liability in the constitutional "special relationship" cases was signifi-
cantly broader than the scope of liability defined by common law special relationships. In the 
leading case, Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1052 
(1985), the court noted that a "special relationship" could arise if, for example, the govern-
ment had expressly indicated its intent to protect, or the government merely had knowledge 
of the risk of harm. See 747 F.2d at 194 n.11. 
205. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1988), 
revd. in light of DeShaney, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990}; Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. 
County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-511 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen, 141 F.2d at 190-94 & 194 n.11 
(dicta). But see Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (11th 
Cir. 1987); Harpole v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1987); 
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special-relationship analysis, purporting to limit liability to custodial 
or custody-like situations.206 
The Supreme Court's approach in DeShaney is best understood 
as a way to cabin liability in a potentially troubling category of cases 
by restricting liability to an easily defined and relatively less troub-
ling context. If general failure-to-protect claims are at one end of 
the spectrum of cases raising resource-allocation concerns, custody 
cases are clearly at the other. When the government has placed an 
individual in custody, it has already undertaken the task of provid-
ing - and paying for - that person's most basic needs: food, shel-
ter, clothing, and so on. These expenditures have already been 
included in the budget allocated to prisons or other custodial insti-
tutions. Whatever extra expenditures are required to provide basic 
medical care and protection from injury are merely adjustments at 
the margin;201 the basic allocations already have been made. More-
over, unlike society at large, the prison context is a limited environ-
ment in which governmental officials have a tremendous amount of 
control. That control gives them many more options for providing 
protection - options less likely to implicate resource allocation at 
the macro level - than are available outside the prison context. 
For example, prisoners can be prevented from harming one another 
by rearranging, separating, or isolating them from each other. In 
addition, even the total number of individuals who are subject to 
incarceration - and are thus guaranteed some minimal level of 
protection - is itself under the control of governmental officials; 
legislatures determine lengths of incarceration for various crimes, 
parole boards determine when prisoners will be paroled, and judges 
determine when alternatives to incarceration - for example, for 
juvenile offenders - might be warranted. All of these factors 
make the scope of liability for failure to protect in the custodial 
setting both more predictable and more limited. They also make it 
less likely that liability for failure to protect would involve the 
courts in reviewing resource-allocation decisions at the macro level. 
DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987), affd., 
489 U.S. 189 (1989); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 882 {1986). 
206. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98 & n.4. 
207. The duty of protection in this context is quite modest. The lower courts have held 
that prison officials are not liable for mere negligence; liability attaches only if they are "de-
liberately indifferent" to the risk of injury. In addition, the responsibility to provide medical 
treatment is limited to "serious medical needs." See, e.g., Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 
717, 719 {7th Cir. 1995). 
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Thus, permitting liability in the custody setting is defensible from 
the standpoint of resource allocation.2os 
Perhaps more importantly, in DeShaney, the Supreme Court 
fastened upon a "bright-line" rule that permitted liability in the 
clearly defined context of custody, without inviting the more troub-
ling variety and volume of such claims in the noncustodial set-
ting.209 Tue Court specifically disapproved a line of lower court 
cases that would have permitted broader liability in such contexts as 
social services210 and police protection,211 based on the broadly de-
fined theory of "special relationship."212 Further, despite certain 
statements made by the DeShaney Court that have led lower courts 
to extend the duty to protect beyond the custodial context,213 the 
majority declined to cite with approval any case finding liability 
outside that setting. Tue Supreme Court's approach apparently was 
intended to avoid the difficult line-drawing problems occasioned by 
a more broadly defined duty to protect. 
The Court's approach reflects its continuing concern that all 
manner of garden-variety torts not be turned into constitutional 
claims under the generic language of the Due Process Clause.214 
Given that the affirmative right to protection urged upon the Court 
in DeShaney has a very limited reach even in tort, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court sought to limit such liability under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Halting liability at the jailhouse door provides the 
obvious benefit of a clear rule with no danger of a "slippery slope" 
208. There is also a sense in which the custody cases do not need a resource-allocation 
rationale: the duty to protect in custodial settings has the normatively powerful rationale, 
captured in cases like City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983), 
and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), that the government may not restrain an 
individual's ability to care for herself and then fail to provide her most basic human needs. 
But, when that rationale is pushed outside the custodial setting, as the plaintiffs in DeShaney 
tried to do, there is the need for a theory to explain why some cases result in liability and 
some do not. 
209. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. 
210. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey ex rel Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d 
Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 1052 (1985). 
211. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1988), 
revd. in light of DeShaney, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). 
212. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98. 
213. See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text. 
214. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 ("[A] reading" that would regard every injury 
perpetrated by the government as a violation of Due Process ''would make of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a font of tort law •... "), rehg. denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976); see also Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) (holding that due process claims require more than 
negligence); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981) (holding that the existence of an 
adequate state remedy forecloses certain substantive due process claims). 
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toward generalized liability for failure to protect or failure to pro-
vide aid, a result that the Court obviously wished to avoid.21s 
To appreciate the full extent of the "risk" that clearly troubled 
the Court, consider the sheer volume of claims that could poten-
tially be brought under a broader reading of the Due Process 
Clause: virtually every tort committed by a private individual that 
the government potentially could have prevented could give rise to 
a federal claim. The sheer number of such cases that would appear 
in the federal courts is truly staggering, especially when one consid-
ers that such liability could arise over virtually the whole range of 
public services. It seems likely that the deep pocket of governmen-
tal liability would encourage any individual who plausibly could 
claim the failure of protective services as a cause of her injuries to 
do so.216 Even if many of these cases ultimately did not result in 
liability - for example, on grounds of causation, failure to show 
faUlt, or qualified immunity - the litigation burden on government 
entities and public officials would be enormous. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that requiring a showing of "deliberate indif-
ference" or "bad faith" would sufficiently limit liability. However, 
allegations of bad faith are easy to make but difficult and costly to 
litigate because they require fact-intensive inquiry into the mental 
processes of governmental officials.217 Again, even if many such 
cases were ultimately dismissed, they would expose the governmen-
tal defendant to the burdens of broadranging discovery and the 
costs of trial.218 The Court apparently took the view that given its 
215. The DeShaney opinion states: 
(T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affinnative right to governmental aid, 
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of 
which the government itself may not deprive the individual. . . . If the Due Process 
Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective serv-
ices, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that 
could have been averted had it chosen to provide them. 
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97. Judge Posner, who wrote the lower court opinion in 
DeShaney, expressed the "slippery slope" concern in an earlier case, Jackson v. City of Joliet, 
715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The next case if this one succeeds will be one where the 
police and fire departments, maybe because of budget cuts, do not arrive at the scene of the 
accident at all."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). 
216. A similar argument has been made in the context of prosecutorial immunity. See 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) ("(S]uits [for malicious prosecution] could be 
expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transfonn his resentment at being 
prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the state's advocate .••. 
Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to 
the honest prosecutor."). 
217. This is one reason for the Court's move away from subjective bad faith as an ele-
ment of the qualified immunity defense. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 
(1982). 
218. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25. 
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slippery-slope concerns and the high cost of identifying meritorious 
claims not implicating budgetary issues, the game was not worth the 
candle. 
Thus, the best way to understand the Supreme Court's decision 
to limit affirmative-duty claims to the custodial setting is as a rights-
defining solution to the specter of a very intrusive remedy: the 
Court apparently chose to define the scope of the due process right 
narrowly in order to avoid liability that would intrude upon political 
decisions.219 
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has responded to 
the troubling remedial implications of section 1983 liability by nar-
rowing the scope of the underlying right. The Court seems to have 
taken a similar approach in the structural-reform cases. These cases 
are characterized by the grant of detailed affirmative injunctions 
requiring governmental defendants to take specific steps to elimi-
nate unconstitutional behaviors or conditions.220 The Supreme 
Court has sanctioned such broad relief in a very limited set of con-
texts, including school desegregation, prison reform, and voting re-
apportionment.221 Once the courts find a constitutional violation in 
these contexts, they are understood to have broad powers to craft 
detailed affirmative remedies governing the specifics of how the of-
fending institutions are to be run. It is not hard to see that such 
remedies are extremely intrusive into what are ordinarily highly dis-
cretionary executive and legislative decisions. One way the 
Supreme Court has responded to the remedial implications of these 
suits is to limit the scope of the right that can give rise to the rem-
edy in the first place.222 So, for example, in prison-reform cases the 
Court has upheld structural-reform decrees under the Eighth 
Amendment only when prison conditions are egregious under the 
219. A number of scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's general approach to 
tortlike due process claims has been to narrow the scope of the right in order to limit the 
reach of the remedy. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 COR-
NELL L. REv. 405 (1977). 
220. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text. 
221. The federal courts also have granted structural-injunctive relief guaranteeing mini-
mally adequate treatment to involuntarily confined mental patients. See, e.g., Welsch v. 
Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 {8th Cir. 1977); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), 
revd. on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 {1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 {M.D. Ala. 
1971), affd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 {5th Cir. 1974). At least one 
court has intervened in the foster care context. See LliShawn A. ex rel Moore v. Kelly, 990 
F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 {1994). 
222. See generally Fletcher, supra note 105, at 683-91. 
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"totality of the circumstances"223 but not on the basis of an isolated, 
questionable practice.224 Similarly, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated its hostility toward a claimed Fourteenth Amendment "right 
to treatment" owed to patients in state mental hospitals in cases 
where finding such a right implicated a broad structural remedy.225 
Faced with the specter of another, potentially intrusive remedy 
- this time under the Due Process Clause - with implications for 
a wide range of governmental services including prisons, social ser-
vices, police departments, fire departments, ambulance, and 911 
services, the Supreme Court opted for a bright-line rule. As in the 
structural-reform context, the Court apparently sought to confine a 
category of cases with potentially troubling and intrusive remedial 
implications by narrowly defining the right. 
It might be objected that the very existence of structural-reform 
litigation undermines the argument that courts are not institution-
ally competent to handle claims that implicate political decisions, 
such as the allocation of public resources: If courts are deemed 
competent to craft and administer intrusive structural remedies that 
impinge upon the prerogatives of the executive and legislative 
branches - and even to open the way for tax increases necessary to 
pay for such remedies226 - then why not in the context of failure-
to-protect claims? One answer is that, after nearly fifty years of 
experience with structural-reform litigation, it is not at all clear that 
courts are, in fact, good at micromanaging the decisions of the polit-
ical branches. There is a significant literature questioning both 
whether courts ultimately are competent to craft and administer 
223. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (permitting a district court order limit-
ing to 30 days the time spent in punitive "isolation" in light of the "long and unhappy history 
of the litigation" and as a way of insuring "against the risk of inadequate compliance"). 
224. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 341, 347-50 (1981} (reversing a district-court 
order that would have prohibited double-celling in an otherwise "topflight, first-class facil-
ity"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (reversing a detailed remedial order that would 
have required a four-year-old prison to change a number of its practices). In Bell, the Court 
warned that the judiciary should not become "enmeshed in the minutiae of prison opera-
tions" and noted that the "wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional and statu-
tory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government." 
441 U.S. at 562. 
225. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981} (dis-
missing a class action suit brought on behalf of mentally retarded residents of a state institu-
tion without reaching the constitutional question and noting that "this Court has never found 
that the involuntarily committed have a constitutional 'right to treatment,' much less the 
voluntarily committed"}. See generally Fletcher, supra note 105, at 688-91. 
226. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (affirming a circuit court holding that the 
district court supervising a desegregation remedy may authorize a school board to submit a 
levy to the state tax-collection authorities and enjoin the operation of state laws hindering 
the school district from adequately funding the remedy). 
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structural-reform decrees227 and whether such remedies are effec-
tive in bringing about their desired result.228 Moreover, the trend 
in the Supreme Court is to constrain, if not contract, the reach of 
structural remedies. In addition to limiting the contexts in which 
such remedies are permitted,229 the Court increasingly has reserved 
structural injunctions for extraordinary circumstances230 and has 
continued to enforce the requirement that their scope not exceed 
the scope of the violation.231 Thus, the mere existence of structural-
reform litigation does not negate that such remedies are reserved 
for narrow circumstances, and they continue to be controversial on 
institutional competence grounds. 
More importantly, whatever the merits or demerits of 
structural-reform litigation - and the more activist judiciary it rep-
resents - as a positive matter, courts adjudicating constitutional 
failure-to-protect claims largely have rejected the expanded judicial 
role represented by structural-reform cases and embraced a more 
traditional one. Those who broadly defend the propriety of 
structural-reform remedies may, for similar reasons, disagree with 
the courts' dispositions of failure-to-protect claims. That, however, 
suggests that a significant component of the controversy over 
227. For critical or cautionary views of structural reform litigation, see generally DONALD 
L. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS AND SOCIAL PouCY (1977); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Polit-
ical Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 
(1979); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); Paul 
J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 949 (1978); and 
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. 
L. REv. 661 (1978). For more favorable views, see generally Abram Cha yes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Abram Chayes, The Supreme 
Court, 1981 Term - Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. 
REv. 4 (1982); Fiss, supra note 122; Fletcher, supra note 105; Rudenstine, supra note 122; 
David Rudenstine, Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism and 
the Debate over Political Structure, 59 S. CAL- L. REv. 449 (1986). 
228. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
.AlloUT SOCIAL CHANoE? (1991); see also generally HOROWITZ, supra note 227. 
229. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the one context where the Supreme Court 
has clearly permitted failure-to-protect liability - the custodial setting - it also has permit-
ted structural relief. But in the law-enforcement context, where the Supreme Court disal-
lowed structural remedies, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the federal courts also have eschewed failure-to-protect claims. 
The courts' reasoning for disallowing both kinds of relief in the latter context was to avoid 
micromanaging political decisions about the allocation and distribution of state and local law-
enforcement resources. See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113 (holding that federal courts should 
avoid using structural injunctions to "oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on 
a continuing basis"); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The next 
case if this one succeeds will be one where the police and fire departments, maybe because of 
budget cuts, do not arrive at the scene of the accident at all."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 
(1984). 
230. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
231. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 
267 (1977). 
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DeShaney and similar cases may involve a broader disagreement 
between those who embrace a more traditional view of courts as 
adjudicators of concrete disputes and those who view the courts as 
architects of broader political and social change. 
Finally, it might be objected that whatever the restraints or poli-
cies applicable to tort claims, they are wholly irrelevant to the ques-
tion of what standard of behavior is required by the Constitution: 
the operative question is what the Constitution requires, and, once 
determined, that is the end of the inquiry. As Thomas Eaton and 
Michael Wells have argued: "[T]here is nothing distinctly constitu-
tional about a judicial policy favoring the preservation of executive 
and legislative discretion [to allocate public resources]."232 To the 
extent that objection is a normative assertion about what considera-
tions ought to be part of the inquiry in these cases, I do not purport 
to answer it in this article; my purpose here is to offer a positive 
rationale for the pattern of liability in this class of cases rather than 
primarily to defend the rationale on normative grounds. That hav-
ing been said, Eaton and Wells are simply wrong in their assertion. 
Although the notion of judicial deference to the political branches 
appears in many legal contexts, it has particular salience in the task 
of analyzing constitutional claims: structural constitutional consid-
erations, such as separation-of-powers and federalism, are surely 
implicated when contemplated judicial action could trench upon the 
prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches or involve 
micromanaging certain affairs of the states. 
Moreover, the proper scope for failure-to-protect liability is not 
simply a question of constitutional law but a question of constitu-
tional remedies; it is well-accepted that determining the scope of 
remedies under section 1983 involves legal and policy considera-
tions that are not wholly constitutional.233 Not every constitutional 
violation gives rise to a damages remedy; for example, governmen-
tal officials whose conduct is reasonable under clear law receive 
qualified immunity from damages even if their conduct violated 
constitutional norms.234 Qualified immunity is justified on largely 
232. Eaton & Wells, supra note 8, at 129. 
233. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing influence of common law 
on § 1983 jurisprudence). The Supreme Court could perhaps be faulted, in this regard, for 
discussing cases such as DeShaney in terms of constitutional rights rather than constitutional 
remedies. 
234. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731 (1991) (arguing that 
qualified immunity, like other doctrines based on the jurisprudence of "new law," is best 
located within the law of remedies). 
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nonconstitutional grounds, such as avoiding overdeterrence and 
preventing unfair surprise.235 Similarly, the rationales for eschew-
ing respondeat superior liability against governmental units - and 
embracing a "custom or policy" requirement - but also denying 
them qualified immunity rely heavily on policy considerations 
about the relative importance of compensation, deterrence, and risk 
spreading.236 It is not surprising, then, that the scope of section 
1983 liability for failure to protect also should be determined, in 
part, by broader policy considerations implicated by damage liabil-
ity against the government. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the strong presumption against liability in 
constitutional failure-to-protect cases is largely the result of judicial 
reluctance to get involved in second-guessing political decisions. 
This notion that certain kinds of decisions should be left to the 
political branches rather than the courts reflects strongly held and 
normatively powerful beliefs about how our governmental system 
should operate. It is grounded in the separation of powers and in-
cludes the familiar idea that the various branches have different ar-
eas of institutional competence. This idea resonates in many areas 
of the law and can be seen in a number of doctrines, from the polit-
ical question doctrine, to institutional constraints on judicial inter-
pretation of statutes, to the granting of prosecutorial immunity. 
Critics of DeShaney and other failure-to-protect cases have 
pointed out the possible moral and constitutional objections to 
nonliability, but they have not adequately considered objections to 
liability bottomed on the notion that failure-to-protect claims raise 
resource-allocation issues better left to the political branches. To 
the extent that failure-to-protect cases raise such issues, the call for 
broader liability is also a challenge to a conception of government 
- adhered to by the courts in these cases - that leaves to the 
legislative judgment how to arrange the relative spheres of public 
and private activities. Individuals might differ on exactly where the 
line ought to be drawn between political versus judicial action and, 
indeed, between governmental versus private responsibility. But 
the important point is that the line drawing in these cases may have 
less to do with constitutional law and more to do with judgments 
235. See Harlow, 451 U.S. at 813-817. 
236. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of 
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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about who should decide the limits of governmental responsibility 
and what those limits should be. 
Proponents of broader liability who have couched the issues pri-
marily in constitutional and moral terms have missed an important 
dimension of the debate; they have not acknowledged - or ade-
quately defended - the broader, institutional implications of their 
proposals. Yet only adequate consideration of the institutional con-
cerns raised by failure-to-protect claims can make sense of the 
strong presumption against liability in constitutional failure-to-
protect cases. 
